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NOTES
FELONIOUS, ERRONEOUS, IT’S ALL ODIOUS:
A STORY OF DEBT GONE WRONG
Virginia M. Brown*
Iraq is paying off debt from Saddam Hussein’s rule. South Africa is
paying off debt obligations incurred under apartheid rule. Argentina is
renegotiating debts that can be traced back to a de facto military-civilian
regime that was ousted in 1976. There are numerous examples in which
sovereigns are paying off debts that previous governing regimes incurred
while oppressing their citizens. Should sovereigns be obligated to pay these
debts? Were the debts really incurred by the sovereign or were they
incurred by the governing regime in question? What if the lender knew in
advance what the proceeds would be used for?
The doctrine of odious debt seeks to resolve this dilemma. It proposes
that sovereigns should not have to pay back debts that were incurred
without the consent of the people and for purposes that do not benefit the
people, provided that the lender was aware of each of these conditions. The
doctrine itself is almost a century old, but sovereigns have yet to embrace it
due to fear of the repercussions. Scholars have proposed ex ante and ex
post mechanisms to apply the doctrine, but none have been accepted to
date. This Note proposes a unique solution that seeks to identify odious
expenditures before debt proceeds are entirely exhausted by a regime,
providing a remedy that falls between the traditional ex ante and ex post
solutions.
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INTRODUCTION
Sovereigns have questioned the legitimacy of odious debt1 for more than
a century, at least since William H. Taft arbitrated Great Britain v. Costa
Rica2 (“the Tinoco Arbitration”) in 1923.3 The topic has been debated in
the scholarly community since Alexander Sack formalized the doctrine in
1927.4 After a period of relatively little dialogue on the matter, the topic
was revitalized in 2003 with the crumble of the Saddam Hussein regime.5
The newly instated Iraqi government successfully renegotiated its debt with
the Paris Club,6 representing one-third of its total postregime external debts,
down 80 percent.7 It did so with the support of key U.S. and World Bank
(or “the Bank”) officials who advocated for the forgiveness of Iraqi bond
debt that was used for odious purposes.8 At its core, the doctrine of odious
debt seeks to resolve the moral and economic dilemma9 of what should
happen to a sovereign’s debts after a despotic regime incurs the debt for
purposes that do not benefit its citizens and is subsequently overthrown.10
A whitepaper published by the Obama-Biden campaign in 2008 has since
politicized the issue in the United States: “As president, Barack Obama
will lead a multilateral effort to address the issue of ‘odious debt’ by
investigating ways in which ‘loan sanctions’ might be employed to create
disincentives for private creditors to lend money to repressive, authoritarian
regimes.”11 No significant political progress has been made since Obama
raised the issue during his initial election. However, the ongoing debt
debate regarding Argentina’s debt, as evidenced in NML Capital, Ltd. v.

1. Odious debt was traditionally defined as “debts incurred by a despotic regime that do
not benefit the people bound to repay the loans.” Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert
B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201, 1203 (2007).
2. 1 R.I.A.A. 371 (1923).
3. Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1216–18.
4. See id. at 1218.
5. See generally Jai Damle, The Odious Debt Doctrine After Iraq, 70 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 139, 150 (2007) (“Following the regime change in Iraq, there was an increase in
conferences and articles on odious debt.”); Anna Gelpern, What Iraq and Argentina Might
Learn from Each Other, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 391, 393 (2005).
6. The Paris Club is an informal group of creditors that tries to develop sustainable debt
payment solutions for debtor nations. PARIS CLUB, http://www.clubdeparis.org/en (last
visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/JSH8-TPNJ].
7. See MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IRAQ’S DEBT RELIEF: PROCEDURE
AND POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL DEBT RELIEF 9 (2006), http://fpc.state.
gov/documents/organization/65761.pdf [http://perma.cc/D2MA-QNV2]; YVONNE WONG,
SOVEREIGN FINANCE AND THE POVERTY OF NATIONS: ODIOUS DEBT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8
(2012); see also Associated Press, Eighty Percent of Iraq Debt Cut by Paris Club, USA
TODAY (Nov. 21, 2004), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-11-21-iraqdebt-cut_x.htm (“The United States had been pressing for up to 95% of the Paris Club debt
to be lifted.”) [http://perma.cc/G2AN-EGFH].
8. See WEISS, supra note 7, at 9.
9. For a discussion of the moral and economic justifications that have been given for
the doctrine, see infra Part II.C.1.
10. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1224.
11. OBAMA FOR AMERICA, STRENGTHENING OUR COMMON SECURITY BY INVESTING IN
OUR COMMON HUMANITY, http://www.cgdev.org/doc/blog/obama_strengthen_security.pdf
(last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/D4UT-Y9CM].

728

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

Republic of Argentina,12 beckons a new tide of literature and discussion on
this sovereign debt issue.
This Note begins in Part I by providing a broad overview of sovereign
debt. It then looks at issues specific to odious debt, including a discussion
of the basics of odious debt, the historical background, and the importance
of addressing the issue today. Part II first reviews proposed ex post
institutional remedies to the doctrine. It then steps back to look at the ex
ante solutions developed by scholars. In Part III, this Note proposes a
solution falling between ex ante and ex post solutions that expands the role
of traditional actors in sovereign debt issuances.
I. FROM THE TOP:
SOVEREIGN DEBT AND THE ODIOUS DEBT DOCTRINE
This part first provides a general overview on sovereign debt, including
some distinguishing factors between sovereign and corporate debt and the
specific challenges presented by sovereign debt. It then explores issues
specific to odious debt. It concludes by stating why the issue needs to be
addressed today.
A. An Overview of Sovereign Debt
Sovereigns, like corporations, are able to increase their available funds by
incurring debt or raising capital. Corporations seek equity by issuing
stock.13 Sovereigns, instead, impose taxes on their constituents to fund
their budgetary needs.14 In lieu of diluting their ownership structure,
businesses may incur debt to raise capital,15 such as by taking out loans or
issuing bonds.16 Rather than taxing its people to raise funds, countries may
also incur debt through the same channels.17
Despite their apparent similarities in fundraising, there are several
distinctions between loans and bonds. Loans are traditionally issued by a
single lender who engages in high level monitoring of the debtor.18 Due to
the steep costs associated with monitoring loans, they are traditionally
highly illiquid and cannot be traded.19 Bonds, on the other hand, are

12. 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012); see infra note 139 (providing an overview of the NML
Capital litigation).
13. See Yankov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade & Marcel Kahan, A New Governance
Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV. 447, 450 (1999).
14. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1211.
15. See Amihud, Garbade & Kahan, supra note 13, at 450.
16. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Do the Securities Laws Matter? The Rise of the
Leveraged Loan Market, 39 J. CORP. L. 725, 727 (2014) (describing the traditional
differences between loans and bonds and arguing that in recent years “bonds and loans are
now virtually interchangeable”). Fontenay describes changes in the structuring of loans that
have led to an established market for trading on loans, lessening the traditional distinctions
between the two forms of debt. Id.
17. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1211.
18. See de Fontenay, supra note 16, at 727.
19. See id.
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traditionally held by a large variety of bondholders who do not engage in
intense monitoring.20 Bonds are usually highly transferrable.21
Securitization22 of sovereign debt began in the 1990s and has permitted
traditional investors to invest in sovereign debt.23 Most sovereign bonds
are issued under New York or English law.24 Foreign sovereign bonds
governed by New York law are typically issued through a fiscal agency
agreement.25 This agreement provides the terms of the bond and the
relationship between the fiscal agent and the debtor issuing the bond (the
issuer).26 Under fiscal agency agreements, the agent represents the bond
issuer, not the bondholders.27 Each bondholder retains its enforcement
rights against the issuer.28
The primary alternative arrangement for issuing bonds is through a trust
indenture or trust deed.29 Under English law, the standard practice is to
structure a sovereign bond issuance pursuant to a trust deed.30 In a
departure from the fiscal agent approach, this method utilizes an indenture
trustee who represents the bondholders.31 The indenture provides the terms
of the issuance, including the face value of the bond, payment terms, rights
of the bondholders, and duties of the trustee.32 U.S. trust indentures vary
slightly from English trust deeds, but both allocate at least some
enforcement capabilities to the trustee, such as the ability to accelerate bond
payments in case of a default.33 Default provisions, such as acceleration

20. See id. Bonds can be held by investment banks and regular retail investors. See id.;
see also Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards? The Role of Litigation
in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1072 (2004).
21. See Amihud, Garbade & Kahan, supra note 13, at 450.
22. Securitization is the packaging of separate financial products into a single product,
which then issues different tranches of the product to investors. See de Fontenay, supra note
16, at 741 n.84.
23. See generally Gelpern, supra note 5, at 397.
24. Udaibir S. Das, Michael G. Papaioannou & Christoph Trebesch, Sovereign Debt
Restructurings 1950–2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts 41 (IMF, Working
Paper No. WP/12/203, 2012), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12203.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4B33-DTC9].
25. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51
EMORY L.J. 1317, 1332 (2002); Fisch & Gentile, supra note 20, at 1103.
26. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 20, at 1102.
27. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 25, at 1332; Fisch & Gentile, supra note 20, at
1102.
28. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 25, at 1332.
29. See id. at 1331–32; Fisch & Gentile, supra note 20, at 1102–03.
30. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 20, at 1103.
31. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 25, at 1331; Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders
and Corporate Governance, 41 BUS. LAW. 413, 413 (1986).
32. See generally Ad Hoc Comm. for Revision of the 1983 Model Simplified Indenture,
Revised Model Simplified Indenture, 55 BUS. LAW. 1115 (2000) [hereinafter Revised Model
Simplified Indenture].
33. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 25, at 1330–31; Fisch & Gentile, supra note 20,
at 1103. Unlike the bond trustee, the fiscal agent generally lacks the discretionary power to
accelerate bond payments. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 25, at 1330.
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clauses, permit the use of court proceedings by bondholders to protect their
rights under the agreement against the debtor.34
Distinctions between sovereign and corporate debtors are apparent when
reviewing the capabilities of the issuer to pay its debts. When a corporate
debtor becomes insolvent, there are bankruptcy regimes established to settle
its debts with creditors through debt restructuring.35 In the absence of a
successful reorganization, a corporation’s debt ends with a liquidation of
assets and the dissolution of the company.36 Similar to a corporation, a
sovereign could arguably liquidate some of its assets.37 Unlike a
corporation, however, a sovereign debtor can—at least in an abstract
sense—always pay its debt.38 The government may increase taxes or divert
domestic production to generate foreign export revenue.39 With these
capabilities, it becomes more difficult to determine the extent of a country’s
insolvency.40
And further unlike corporate entities, no bankruptcy mechanism currently
exists to liberate a country from its debts;41 thus, sovereign entities do not
have the ability to dissolve when they are unable to pay their debts.42 Even
when a new government regime takes over, the country’s legal personality
continues, requiring the state to assume the debt incurred by the country
under the predecessor regime.43
Sovereigns, thus, face a unique problem in which they cannot cleanse
themselves from previously incurred debt.44 The lack of an institutional
remedy does not preclude sovereigns from attempting to renegotiate their
debts directly with the bondholders.45 However, it has led some
34. See Revised Model Simplified Indenture, supra note 32, at 1135–39 (providing the
defaults and remedies provisions under Article 6 of the model indenture).
35. Thomas S. Wyler, Wiping the Slate: Maintaining Capital Markets While Addressing
the Odious Debt Dilemma, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 947, 955–56 (2008). See generally THOMAS
H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 8–11 (1986) (discussing the
fundamentals of bankruptcy law and creditor remedies outside of bankruptcy).
36. See Wyler, supra note 35, at 956.
37. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Evolution of Contractual
Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 131, 133 (2012) (“Greece, for example,
could theoretically sell the Parthenon or some of its sovereign territory.”).
38. See Jonathan Sedlak, Sovereign Debt Restructuring:
Statutory Reform or
Contractual Solution?, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1483, 1487 (2013) (“If a company fails to repay
its debts, the business can be dismantled by the unpaid creditors. However, no parallel
mechanism exists to force repayment by sovereign nations since no creditor has the ability to
dismantle or liquidate a country.”).
39. See id. at 1488.
40. See id.
41. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1207.
42. See id.
43. See Paul Williams & Jennifer Harris, State Succession to Debts and Assets: The
Modern Law and Policy, 42 HARV. INT’L J.L. 355, 362 (2001).
44. See Anna Gelpern, A Skeptic’s Case for Sovereign Bankruptcy, 50 HOUS. L. REV.
1095, 1119 (2013) (asserting “the idea of a truly fresh start is essentially inconceivable for a
sovereign”). But cf. JACKSON, supra note 35, at 225–52 (discussing individuals’ ability to
obtain a fresh start under bankruptcy law).
45. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 20, at 1044. The restructuring may result in a new
payment schedule, lower debt obligation, or both. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra
note 24, at 7.
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bondholders to take advantage of the institutional shortcoming by holding
out from a sovereign’s debt restructuring plan and seeking payment of the
full contracted amount in the courtroom.46
These holdout creditors are commonly referred to as “vulture funds.”47
Vulture funds generally purchase sovereign debt at a deep discount after the
country has been in financial distress for an extended period of time and the
bond’s value has significantly dropped.48 While most bondholders agree to
debt restructurings in these circumstances, vulture funds hold out for full
repayment on their investments.49 The average payout for a successful
vulture fund is between three and twenty times the actual price the fund
paid for the debt.50
NML Capital, Ltd. (“NML Capital”) is one such vulture fund.51
Argentina defaulted on its bond debt in 2001.52 NML Capital, a holder of
the Argentine bonds, has since refused to participate in the country’s 2005
and 2010 debt restructurings.53 Instead, the fund sought full payment in the
Southern District of New York.54 The court held that Argentina had
violated the terms of its bond agreements and the fund was entitled to full
payment.55
In addition to the traditional restructuring negotiations that develop
privately between sovereigns and their bondholders, there have been some
recent efforts to address the lack of a formal system to discharge sovereign
debts. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) proposed a restructuring
46. See, e.g., Fisch & Gentile, supra note 20, at 1075–88 (discussing sovereign debt
cases involving Argentina, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Brazil, Peru, and Bolivia); Gelpern, supra
note 5, at 394 (“The erosion of sovereign immunities since the 1950s exposed governments
to a real risk of creditor lawsuits in national courts. The result was a boon for the
development of private law in an area previously dominated by foreign ministries.”). See
infra notes 122–25 and accompanying text for a discussion on why this switch occurred in
the 1950s.
47. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 20, at 1045 n.2; John Muse-Fisher, Starving the
Vultures: NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina and Solutions to the Problem of
Distressed-Debt Funds, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1671, 1673 (2001). While the term has negative
connotations, some scholars suggest that holdout creditors may actually be beneficial.
Compare Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 24, at 28 (noting that creditor holdouts
and litigation is widely seen as the main reason for delayed and inefficient debt
restructurings), with Fisch & Gentile, supra note 20, at 1098–99 (arguing that vulture funds
may actually improve the restructuring process and steer sovereigns away from opportunistic
defaults), and Gelpern, supra note 44, at 1102 (citing that “[r]ecent empirical studies confirm
that . . . holdouts have not held up many sovereign bond restructurings”).
48. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 20, at 1045 n.2; Muse-Fisher, supra note 47, at
1673.
49. See Caroline M. Gentile, The Market for Odious Debt, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
151, 167 (2010) (“[Vulture funds purchase] the debt of troubled issuers for pennies on the
dollar and then, once a violation of the terms of the bonds occurs, seek to enforce their rights
(including, when applicable, the right to the repayment of the full value of the debt) through
litigation.”).
50. See Muse-Fisher, supra note 47, at 1673–74.
51. See, e.g., id. at 1674.
52. See Gelpern, supra note 44, at 1117; Muse-Fisher, supra note 47, at 1689.
53. See Muse-Fisher, supra note 47, at 1689.
54. See infra note 139.
55. See infra note 139.
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mechanism in 2001 to address this institutional shortcoming.56 However, it
failed to pick up traction due to institutional inadequacies and a lack of
support from the United States.57
The Group of Seven (“G-7”)58 agreed to the Debt-Relief Initiative for
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (“HIPC Initiative”) in 1996.59 This
initiative resolved to provide debt relief to a large number of the world’s
least developed countries.60 While noble in its goal, the initiative faced
criticism by traditional advocates of HIPC debt relief because, it was
argued, the debts were incurred by regimes wrought with unaccountable
corruption and wasteful spending.61 Essentially, these advocates feared that
sovereigns would not benefit from the debt relief because they would
continue the same policies as before.62 Should the sovereign be given debt
relief if its policies will likely change? Should debt relief be permitted for a
sovereign that was ruled by a corrupt regime when it incurred the debt, but
has since been overthrown? These are questions for the doctrine of odious
debt.63
B. A Dialogue on Odious Debt
Odious debt has been a controversial type of sovereign debt, and
countries have historically avoided its application. Yet, it has sound public
policy justifications that are supported by scholars and politicians alike.
The international economy can benefit from limiting the funds available to
despotic regimes that cause undue harm to people. This section begins with
a basic overview of the odious debt doctrine. Next, it reviews different
categories of debt that may be classified as odious. It then evaluates which
type of shift in control merits use of the doctrine. The section concludes
with a review of some of the doctrine’s applications throughout history.
56. See Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Dir., IMF, Address at the National
Economists’ Club Annual Members’ Dinner: International Financial Architecture for 2002:
A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Nov. 26, 2001), https://www.imf.org/
external/np/speeches/2001/112601.htm [http://perma.cc/KG45-6D6N]; see also Sean Hagan,
Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 299, 301–
02 (2005).
57. See infra notes 250–59 and accompanying text.
58. The G-7 consists of major industrial countries (namely, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) that periodically convene to discuss
major economic and financial issues. A Guide to Committees, Groups, and Clubs, IMF (Sept.
17, 2015), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/groups.htm#G7 [http://perma.cc/DFU7SNAB].
59. See James V. Feinerman, Odious Debt, Old and New: The Legal Intellectual History
of an Idea, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 214 (2007).
60. See id. The initiative provided the specific level of relief that it felt was necessary
“in a particular country to achieve ‘debt sustainability.’” NANCY BIRDSALL & JOHN
WILLIAMSON, DELIVERING ON DEBT RELIEF: FROM IMF GOLD TO A NEW AID ARCHITECTURE
25 (2002).
61. See BIRDSALL & WILLIAMSON, supra note 60, at 33; Feinerman, supra note 59, at
214–15.
62. See BIRDSALL & WILLIAMSON, supra note 60, at 32.
63. See, e.g., Andrew Yianni & David Tinkler, Is There a Recognized Legal Doctrine of
Odious Debts?, 32 N.C. J. INT’L. & COM. REG. 749, 751 (2007).

2015]

A STORY OF DEBT GONE WRONG

733

1. Breaking Down the Basics
Alexander Sack’s formalization of the doctrine of odious debt called for
three conditions to be met before absolving a state of its obligation to repay
its debts: (1) the debts must be incurred by a despotic power; (2) the
proceeds must result in an absence of benefit to the sovereign’s
constituents; and (3) the creditor must be aware of the first two
conditions.64
The first element requires that a despotic regime incur the debt. This
means that there must be an absence of consent by the people to the
government in place.65 This begs the question of whether a democratically
appointed government is necessarily precluded from the odious debt
analysis.66
The second element requires a determination that debt proceeds were not
used for the benefit of a country’s populace. This is not an exact science.
What makes the use of debt odious under the doctrine? The use of debt
proceeds by a tyrannical leader to suppress internal dissent of its people is
clearly odious.67 A despot using proceeds to fly Aerosmith in to the
country to perform at his daughter’s fifth birthday would also be odious.68
But is hiring Nobel Prize-winning economists to count the grains of sand in
a desert odious or simply a poor use of resources?69
The third prong of Sack’s formulation is that the creditor is aware that the
debts were incurred absent consent of the people and were used for
purposes that lack benefit to the people. In essence, a culpable creditor
accepts the risk of default, shifting the burden of debt payment away from
innocent citizens.70 Put differently, creditors should not have to suffer the
consequences if they were deceived by the regime.71 The subjective nature
of this element has faced criticism.72 Requiring positive knowledge of the

64. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1218 (citing ALEXANDER N.
SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ÉTATS SUR LEURS DETTES PUBLIQUES ET
AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCIÉRES [THE EFFECTS OF STATE TRANSFORMATIONS ON THEIR
PUBLIC DEBTS AND OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS] 157–63 (1927)); Ashfaq Khalfan, Jeff
King & Bryan Thomas, Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine 1–2 (CISDL, Working Paper
No. COM/RES/ESJ/, 2003), http://www.dette2000.org/data/File/odious_debt_CISDL.pdf
[http://perma.cc/BR4W-L9GK].
65. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1218.
66. Id. at 1228–29. Buchheit, Gulati, and Thompson warn that odiousness is a
subjective concept and can invite ethnocentrism. See id.
67. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Odious Debt in Retrospect, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263,
267 (2007).
68. See generally Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1231 (describing loans
made to a regime which are then stolen by its members).
69. See id. at 1231, 1245 (using the “grains of sand” example to show that pointlessly
incurred debts may still bind a noncorrupt sovereign and its people).
70. Id. at 1251.
71. See Wyler, supra note 35, at 966–67.
72. See Christopher G. Paulus, “Odious Debts” Vs. Debt Trap: A Realistic Help?, 31
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 83, 94–95 (2005); see also Seema Jayachandran, Michael Kremer &
Jonathan Shafter, Applying the Odious Debts Doctrine While Preserving Legitimate Lending
18 (June 2006), http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/21472/ApplyingtheOdiousDebtsDoctrine.pdf
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creditor may permit the creditor to circumvent the doctrine by not
determining the use of debt proceeds.73 A more objective “known or
should have known” standard could have a more sound application.74
Under the doctrine, odious debts are considered debts of the government
regime rather than the sovereign itself, because the debt proceeds are not
used for the needs and interests of the sovereign.75 Sack’s argument is that
these debts can only be collected from a particular odious regime if all three
elements have been met.76 As such, the successor government should be
able to legally repudiate debt incurred by its despotic predecessor.77 Sack’s
determination is made after the fact;78 that is, a regime and its debts cannot
be found odious until the debt proceeds are used and the regime has been
overthrown.79 As discussed below, some scholars have approached the
doctrine from an ex ante method in an effort cut off potential lending to
despotic regimes that are likely to generate odious debts.80
2. Defining Odious Debt
The question of what satisfies the second prong of Sack’s test—that the
country uses debt proceeds in a way that does not benefit its people—has
been subject to different interpretations. There is insufficient application of
the doctrine to establish any customary uses or limitations. As such,
scholars have advanced their own categories to analyze types of odious
debt.
Sack advanced two categories of odious debt: (1) debts used to “repress
the population that fights against [the despotic regime],” and (2) debts
incurred by members of government which are “manifestly personal” in
use.81 Recent commentators have expanded the number of classifications.
Andrew Yianni and David Tinkler have identified three types of odious
debt: hostile debt, war debt, and debt of a developing country that does not
benefit its people.82 Hostile debt, they argue, is used “aggressively against
the interests of a population,” such as for war, conquest, and suppressing its
own citizens.83 They distinguish this from war debt, which is incurred by a
(arguing that the subjective standard is too lenient on creditors) [http://perma.cc/MC2869MS].
73. See Paulus, supra note 72, at 94–95; see also Jeff A. King, Odious Debt: The Terms
of the Debate, 32 N.C. J. INT’L & COM. REG. 605, 632–33 (2007).
74. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1251.
75. See King, supra note 73, at 624.
76. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1218 (citing SACK, supra note
64, at 157).
77. See WONG, supra note 7, at 7; Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1218
(citing SACK, supra note 64, at 157).
78. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1218.
79. See id.
80. See infra Part II.B.
81. See Yianni & Tinkler, supra note 63, at 750 (citing PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS
DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION AND THE THIRD WORLD’S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY
165–66 (1991)).
82. See id. at 756–66.
83. Id. at 757.
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state that subsequently loses during a war.84 The conquering government
may choose which war debt obligations of the predecessor government it
would like to assume.85 The third type of debt Yianni and Tinkler propose
is debt of a developing country that is not in the interest of its people.86
This would include using the proceeds for personal items, such as building
lavish mansions and other corrupt purposes.87
Jeff King developed a very similar breakdown of odious debt that he
separated into four categories: war debts, subjugation debts, illegal
occupation debts, and fraudulent, illegal, or corruption debts.88 King’s
“subjugation debts” and “fraudulent, illegal, or corruption debts”
correspond with Yianni and Tinkler’s first and third classifications
discussed above, respectively.89 Illegal occupation debt is based on the
presumption that “foreign occupation can bring no benefits [to a
sovereign’s citizens] unless benefits are specifically proved.”90 He
distinguishes odious war debts, which he describes as debts used by a
predecessor state in war against the successor state, from non-odious warrelated debts.91
Lee Buchheit, Mitu Gulati, and Robert Thompson distinguish war debts
as being separate from odious debt.92 Like odious debt, war debts are an
arguable exception to the general rule of state succession.93 The war debts
exception asks whether debts incurred by a previous regime should be
enforceable against a conquering state.94 It asks what expectations a
creditor should reasonably have when extending credit to a sovereign that is
eventually overthrown by an attacking country.95
3. Applying the Doctrine
Sack’s classic formulation only applies when there has been a
government succession.96 However, the legal community currently lacks a
consensus on whether to apply the doctrine to government succession or
84. See id. at 760.
85. See id. at 761. See infra notes 106–13 for an example of war debts during the
Spanish-American War.
86. See Yianni & Tinkler, supra note 63, at 761–62.
87. See id.
88. See King, supra note 73, at 650–59.
89. See id. at 650–52; supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text.
90. King, supra note 73, at 652.
91. See id. at 650. For example, the United States could not have regarded Iraq’s 2003
debts as war debts because “the United States was neither the target of the armed attack such
loans funded nor the successor state to Iraq.” Id. at 629.
92. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1212–14. The authors define
war debts as those incurred “to finance the conduct of hostilities against a force, foreign or
domestic, that eventually succeeds in overthrowing the contracting government.” Id. at 1212.
93. See id. at 1212–14.
94. See id. For example, after Great Britain took over the South African Republics at
the end of the Boer War, it only offered to assume the Republics’ debts that were incurred
before the start of the war. See id. at 1212–13.
95. See id. at 1213.
96. See Adam Feibelman, Contract, Priority, and Odious Debt, 85 N.C. L. REV. 727,
739 (2007).
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also to state succession.97 A government succession occurs when the
governing body changes but the sovereign itself remains intact.98 Recent
examples of government succession include the regime changes in
Afghanistan and Iraq.99 A state succession occurs “when a territory ceases
to be part of one state and becomes part of another.”100 Under the doctrine
of state succession, the incoming government automatically inherits debts
of the predecessor government.101
The distinctions between state and government succession, however, are
not always clear.102 Professor D.P. O’Connell warns that the distinction
between the two may be so minimal that the classification of a transition “is
often quite arbitrary.”103 Even if the distinction were clear, a number of
scholars advocate expanding the doctrine to cases of state succession.104
4. Contextualizing Odious Debt with a Historical Backdrop
While the doctrine of odious debt has been developed and refined by
scholars over the last century, it has never been expressly cited as grounds
for forgiving sovereign debt by a national or international tribunal.105 This
section first discusses the Spanish-American War and the Tinoco
Arbitration, two of the most frequently cited pieces of history by advocates
of the doctrine. Next, it describes the shift in the landscape provided by the
U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Finally, it addresses the
restructuring of Iraqi and Argentine debt over the last twenty years, which
have helped renew the odious debt discussion.
a. The Spanish-American War
By the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898, Spain had contracted a
large amount of debt that was secured by Cuban revenues.106 The United
States, having seized the Cuban territory, repudiated the debts under
97. See King, supra note 73, at 648 (describing a lack of consensus in the scholarly
community).
98. See Fiebelman, supra note 96, at 739.
99. Tai-Heng Cheng, Renegotiating the Odious Debt Doctrine, 70 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 7, 11 (2007).
100. Fiebelman, supra note 96, at 739; see also Cheng, supra note 99, at 10. For an
example of state succession after the Spanish-American War, see infra notes 106–13.
101. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 208 note (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“International law sharply distinguishes the succession of
states, which may create a discontinuity in statehood, from a succession of governments,
which leaves the statehood unaffected.”). But see King, supra note 73, at 609 (arguing “it is
still far from settled law that a successor state is liable for the debts of the predecessor
state”).
102. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1206; Khalfan, King & Thomas,
supra note 64, at 47.
103. 1 D.P. O’CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW vi
(1967).
104. See, e.g., King, supra note 73, at 648–50; Khalfan, King & Thomas, supra note 64,
at 47.
105. See Gelpern, supra note 5, at 406.
106. See id. at 404.
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multiple theories, including that the debts were not agreed to by and did not
benefit the Cuban people.107 Evidence supported this assertion and
indicated that the debt proceeds, which were added to Spain’s national
budget, ultimately helped oppress the Cuban people.108
Initially, Spain argued that the United States should be responsible for
the debts as they were contracted by Spain when it was the legitimate
governing sovereign of Cuba.109 The United States countered that Spain
was in exclusive control of Cuba’s finances and, therefore, Cuba itself had
not actually contracted the debts.110 During treaty negotiations, both the
United States and Spain asserted several theories in support of their
positions.111 At one point, Spain offered to disclaim all debts not used to
aid improvements in Cuba.112 Ultimately, however, the United States
succeeded in repudiating all of Cuba’s outstanding debts.113
b. The Tinoco Arbitration
Dictator Frederico Tinoco ruled Costa Rica from 1917 to 1919.114 Prior
to being overthrown, Tinoco was able to secure financing from the Royal
Bank of Canada that assisted in his escape but that never made its way to
the Costa Rican people.115 An arbitration ensued in 1923 when the bank
tried to enforce the debts in Costa Rica.116
The sole arbitrator, William H. Taft, distinguished this government
succession from the circumstances involved in a state succession (such as
the one dealt with after the Spanish-American War).117 Taft found that a
change of government has no effect on the debt obligations of the state, but
that the loan itself was fraudulent.118 The bank could not “base its case for
repayment on ‘the mere form of the transaction’ but must prove its good
faith in lending the money ‘for the real use of the Costa Rican Government
under the Tinoco regime . . . for its legitimate use.’”119 But here, the bank
knew that the loan proceeds would be used for the personal benefit of
Tinoco.120
107. See id.; Gentile, supra note 49, at 154–55.
108. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1215; Sara Ludington, Mitu
Gulati & Alfred L. Brophy, Applied Legal History: Demystifying the Doctrine of Odious
Debt, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 247, 251–52 (2010).
109. See Ludington, Gulati & Brophy, supra note 108, at 253.
110. See Gentile, supra note 49, at 154–55; Ludington, Gulati & Brophy, supra note 108,
at 253.
111. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1214–16; Ludington, Gulati &
Brophy, supra note 108, at 250–58.
112. See Ludington, Gulati & Brophy, supra note 108, at 255.
113. See id. at 256.
114. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1216.
115. See Gelpern, supra note 5, at 411; Yianni & Tinkler, supra note 63, at 762.
116. See generally Great Britain v. Costa Rica, 1 R.I.A.A. 371 (1923).
117. See id. at 380; Cheng, supra note 99, at 16; Gelpern, supra note 5, at 411.
118. See Gelpern, supra note 5, at 411.
119. Ludington, Gulati & Brophy, supra note 108, at 258 (quoting Great Britain, 1
R.I.A.A. at 394).
120. See Gelpern, supra note 5, at 411.

738

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

Some scholars, however, do not agree that the arbitration supports the
doctrine. Sarah Ludington, Mitu Gulati, and Alfred L. Brophy argue that
“first, Tinoco was not clearly a despot; second, Taft was an
archconservative and an unlikely champion of debt-burdened fledgling
democracies; third, Taft applied a substance-over-form analysis” by stating,
in essence, that the loans were actually made to Tinoco, not to Costa
Rica.121 Despite this criticism, the Tinoco Arbitration is still cited as a
leading example of the odious debt doctrine in action.
c. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
Sovereigns are generally protected from litigation in domestic courts
under the theory of sovereign immunity.122 This theory began to face
scrutiny in 1952 after the United States adopted a principle that allowed
sovereigns to be sued in connection with borrowing money abroad.123 This
was later codified in the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
the U.K. State Immunity Act of 1979, and numerous similar laws in other
countries.124 These laws showed a level of acceptance in giving up
sovereign immunity, but did not provide significant help to creditors in
enforcing judgments.125
d. The Iraq War and Argentina’s Debt Restructuring
Since the Tinoco Arbitration, the odious debt doctrine has been
Recent examples include debt
implicated on several occasions.126
restructurings conducted by Iraq and Argentina over the last two decades.
Neither sovereign chose to utilize the doctrine.
The doctrine was implicated with the fall of the Iraqi regime in 2003.
When Saddam Hussein was ousted in 2003, Iraq had approximately $125
billion in external debt, including a mixture of bilateral, commercial, and
multilateral (e.g., IMF) creditors.127 Average per capita income in Iraq had

121. See Ludington, Gulati & Brophy, supra note 108, at 260.
122. See Patrick Bolton & David Skeel, Odious Debts or Odious Regimes?, 70 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 91 (2007); Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 37, at 135.
123. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Philip B.
Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984, 984–85
(1952), and in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 714 (1976)
(“[I]t will hereafter be the Department [of State’s] policy to follow [a] restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign governments for a grant of
sovereign immunity.”). Under the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, immunity is
extended to public acts of a state, but not to private acts. See Alfred Dunhill of London, 425
U.S. at 711–13.
124. See Gelpern, supra note 5, at 396 n.21.
125. See id. at 396. For example, Argentina has refused to pay out creditors despite a
court holding that creditors are entitled to payment. See id. at 402.
126. Examples of this include Nazi Germany’s refusal to assume Austrian debts after its
annexation in 1938, postrevolution China’s refusal to accept prerevolution debts in 1952, and
France’s refusal to assume debts in its administration of Algeria in 1962. See King, supra
note 73, at 634–35.
127. See WEISS, supra note 7, at 1.
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dropped from $3836 in 1980 to $715 in 2002.128 Some members of
Congress proposed the repudiation of these debts under the Iraq Freedom
From Debt Act in 2003.129 Iraqi officials did not wish to utilize the
doctrine for debt repudiation, and Congress failed to gain sufficient support
to pass the Act.130 Ultimately, however, negotiations between Iraq and the
Paris Club led to an 80 percent reduction of Paris Club and commercial
debt.131 Iraq is also supposed to receive an overall debt cancellation of 80
percent from all of its creditors.132 By 2010, Iraq had reduced its external
debt to $45 billion.133
Argentina can attribute a portion of its current debt back to debt incurred
by the Junta, a de facto military-civilian regime that ousted the government
in 1976 and increased the public debt eightfold in a period of a few
years.134 Still coping with a significant debt trap, former Argentine
President Nestor Kirchner argued during his 2003 inaugural address, “We
cannot go back to paying our debts at the expense of hunger and exclusion
of Argentines generating more poverty and increasing social conflicts.”135
Creditors, Kirchner argued, cannot collect if Argentina does not do well.136
In 2005, Anna Gelpern reasoned that “[i]f Argentina succeeds [in major
debt restructurings], it will show in graphic terms that most countries
considering [o]dious [d]ebt have ready alternatives for securing deep debt
relief without proving state succession, illegitimacy, or specific knowledge
by the creditors, and without costly and time-consuming claim-by-claim

128. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REBUILDING IRAQ: U.S. ACHIEVEMENTS THROUGH THE
IRAQ RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION FUND 1 (2006), http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/
organization/60952.pdf [http://perma.cc/BM42-3JVA].
129. See WEISS, supra note 7, at 15; see also Cheng, supra note 99, at 26 (“It is
noteworthy that the United States’ call for debt cancellation was not merely for the benefit of
the Iraqis. It also benefitted the U.S. government.”).
130. See WEISS, supra note 7, at 15; WONG, supra note 7, at 8 (“Although not using the
actual terminology of odious debt, the underlying principles of Sack’s doctrine were
espoused by the USA in its rhetoric on Saddam, Iraq’s debt, and Iraq’s repayment
obligations.”).
131. See WEISS, supra note 7, at 1; Omri Ben-Shahar & Mitu Gulati, Partially Odious
Debts?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 54 (2007) (“Iraq received one of the largest writeoffs ever (eighty percent) in the Paris Club.” (citing Andy Metzger, A Mission Accomplished,
LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 10, 2006, at 1)).
132. See WEISS, supra note 7, at 10.
133. See Government Debt, CENTRAL BANK OF IRAQ, http://www.cbi.iq/index.php?pid=
GovernmentSecurities (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/5GB6-UVNA].
134. Ellen Brown, Cry for Argentina: Odious Debt, Fiscal Mismanagement or Pillage?
Financial Mechanisms Which Spearhead Nations into Bankruptcy, CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON
GLOBALIZATION (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.globalresearch.ca/cry-for-argentina-odiousdebt-fiscal-mismanagement-or-pillage-financial-mechanisms-which-spearhead-nations-intobankruptcy/5395691 [http://perma.cc/M84Q-XWTC].
135. Doctor Nestor Kirchner, President of the Republic of Arg., Discurso del Señor
Presidente de la Nación Ante la Honorable Asamblea Legislativa [Inaugural Address of
President Kirchner] (May 25, 2003), http://www.presidencia.gob.ar/discursos-2007/24414,
English translation available in Argentina: Full Text of Kirchner’s Inaugural Speech, BBC
MONITORING INTERNATIONAL REPORTS (May 26, 2003) [http://perma.cc/MN72-M8WN].
136. Gelpern, supra note 5, at 408 n.57 (citing Inaugural Address of President Kirchner,
supra note 135).
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adjudication.”137 By 2010, Argentina managed to reach an agreement with
92 percent of its bondholders to accept about one-third of their original
investment.138
Today, Argentina is still faced with holdout creditors from the
restructuring.139 Bonds held by these creditors can be traced back to the
1970s.140 While Argentina could still raise a defense of odious debt,
pointing to the Junta’s series of illegitimate policies, it has yet to do so.141
C. Revitalization of the Odious Debt Doctrine
For the handful of instances in which the doctrine of odious debt has
been implicated, there is an overabundance of examples in which the
indebted country has wished not to implicate the doctrine.142 Countries that
have accrued unwieldy debts and are undergoing administrative changes
could gain tremendously from the doctrine. Yet, there is a fear of potential
economic backlash—such as higher interest rates and limited access to
capital—in invoking this doctrine to relieve the debts. This section
discusses the need for an odious debt doctrine and the fear sovereigns have
in using it.
1. A Need for the Doctrine
There is continuing debate among scholars on whether the forgiveness of
odious debt is a question of economic or moral consequence.143 Gelpern
suggests that one lesson from Iraq’s recent debt restructuring is that the
international community is willing to provide assistance when a country’s
financial distress represents an “extraordinary political threat,” but that the
same sentiment is not availed to those dealing with periodic government
wrongdoing.144

137. Id. at 410.
138. See Argentina’s Fernandez de Kirchner Wants Creditor Talks, BBC NEWS (June 20,
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-27951439 [http://perma.cc/TZ67-P9PE].
139. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. In October of 2012, the Second
Circuit found that Argentina had breached its debt agreement; it affirmed the district court’s
orders to enjoin Argentina from making payments to its restructured bonds without making
ratable payments to its other bondholders, and it remanded to the district court on the issue
of clarifying the impact of its injunction on third parties. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic
of Argentina, 699 F.3d. 246, 262 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act will not immunize Argentina’s extraterritorial assets from postjudgment
discovery). On remand, the district court amended its injunction orders against Argentina,
and the Second Circuit affirmed. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d
230 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014).
140. See Brown, supra note 134.
141. See id.
142. See infra Part I.C.2.
143. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 122, at 85–87 (discussing the moral and economic
arguments for the doctrine); see also Wyler, supra note 35, at 948 (stating “the scholarly
motivations behind [the doctrine] vary widely—some believe it’s a moral question; others
believe it is an economic one”).
144. Gelpern, supra note 5, at 400.
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Under the moral argument for the doctrine, some despotic regimes are so
reprehensible that they should be condemned by discouraging third parties
from lending to them.145 Odious debt incurred by a predecessor regime
should not be binding on the state’s citizens and the regime that replaces
it.146 They should be deemed unenforceable as a matter of justice.147 This
justification, however, is complicated by the fact that odious regimes do not
always use proceeds for odious purposes.148
The economic justification for the doctrine is that it can be used to
increase the welfare of the sovereign after the despotic regime has been
removed.149 Sovereigns may benefit from a lower debt burden, a lower
likelihood of the emergence of odious regimes that reduce welfare, and a
lower likelihood of long-lasting odious regimes.150 By forcing countries to
pay off cumbersome debt burdens, cycles of economic failure can be
ongoing.151 In developing countries, it is less likely that their outstanding
debt is from original debt obligations than from accrued interest and
refinancing of those original obligations.152 In addition, “[f]ailed states are
increasingly recognized as posing significant threats to the security of the
global community.”153 By forgiving the odious debt of a country, the
doctrine facilitates rebuilding the sovereign’s government and infrastructure
in a timely manner.154
Scholars disagree on whether there is sufficient state practice and case
law to support the doctrine.155 As mentioned above, no tribunals have
expressly used the doctrine as a ground for canceling a country’s sovereign
debt.156 Moreover, some scholars argue that the doctrine “stands on rather

145. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 122, at 85; see also Ludington, Gulati & Brophy,
supra note 108, at 251–58 (discussing the moral justification for debt forgiveness in Cuba
after the Spanish-American War).
146. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 122, at 85.
147. See id.; Sabine Michalowski & Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, Ius Cogens, Transitional
Justice and Other Trends of the Debate on Odious Debts: A Response to the World Bank
Discussion Paper on Odious Debts, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 59, 107 (2009) (“[I]t is
argued that debt might be repudiated, whether or not the country would be able to repay it,
where it would be so unjust as to be immoral to burden the people of the debtor state with
repayment of that debt.”).
148. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 122, at 85 (“Some loans, or portions of some loans,
may be used for beneficial projects such as building bridges or roads, or expanding access to
clean water.”).
149. See id. at 86; Tom Ginsburg & Thomas S. Ulen, Odious Debt, Odious Credit,
Economic Development, and Democratization, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115, 122 (2007)
(arguing that “a sensible solution to the issue of odious debt should explicitly consider the
extent to which forgiveness of odious debt can significantly further [economic development
and democratization]”).
150. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 122, at 86; see also Wyler, supra note 35, at 950.
151. See Wyler, supra note 35, at 950.
152. See Feinerman, supra note 59, at 215.
153. Jayachandran, Kremer & Shafter, supra note 72, at 2.
154. See id.; Ben-Shahar & Gulati, supra note 131, at 49 (arguing that creditors are
frequently in a better position than a sovereign “to protect against [the] harm of
insolvency”); Jayachandran, Kremer & Shafter, supra note 72, at 2.
155. See Michalowski & Bohoslavsky, supra note 147, at 64.
156. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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weak ground” as an international law principle.157 Without an established
law governing the issue, sovereigns pursuing debt relief must use the
common law of courts and customary international law.158 Moreover,
courts must substitute different validations for permitting forgiveness of a
country’s debt. Unfortunately, no single jurisdiction governs the vast
majority of external sovereign debt.159 With different jurisdictions applying
different substantive law, inconsistent precedents are established.160
2. The Fear of the Doctrine
Numerous opportunities to invoke the doctrine of odious debt have
presented themselves in the past.161 In some situations, only two of Sack’s
elements were present, but at other times all three elements were well
evidenced.162 Nevertheless, sovereigns continuously choose not to invoke
the doctrine.163 They are often afraid of raising the doctrine themselves.164
A country that is suitably positioned to invoke the doctrine is one that has
just rid itself of a despotic leader that incurred large debts providing no
benefit to the individuals under its rule. Likely, the country’s people have
just surmounted a great amount of strife to overthrow the despot. The
country is in need of organizing its new government. It is in need of
economic stability, which will require the support of the international
community. The new government, lacking an established, credit worthy
reputation, would be turning away from the debt obligations for which a
promise to repay exists.165 As such, raising the doctrine could tarnish the
country’s reputation with potential lenders in the international
community.166
157. Michalowski & Bohoslavsky, supra note 147, at 64. Scholars disagree on whether
the doctrine should apply to state successions in addition to government successions. See
supra note 97 and accompanying text. Scholars also disagree on whether the doctrine should
be used ex post or whether an institutional remedy is needed to create an ex ante solution.
See generally infra Part II.
158. See Ludington, Gulati & Brophy, supra note 108, at 248.
159. See id. at 248–49.
160. See id.; Paul B. Stephan, The Institutionalist Implications of an Odious Debt
Doctrine, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 213, 229 (2007) (“[R]esting the odious debt doctrine
on customary international law [risks] the possibility of divergent interpretations.”).
161. See Yianni & Tinkler, supra note 63, at 767.
162. Compare id. at 763–66 (noting that an application of the doctrine to World Duty
Free Limited v. Republic of Kenya would not meet Sack’s second prong because “in the
absence of [a bribe to Kenya’s president], it would be difficult to argue that a contract to
build substantial facilities at two major airports would be against the interests of Kenya”),
with Damle, supra note 5, at 139–40 (discussing the Apartheid’s debt in South Africa).
163. As noted above, Iraqi officials adamantly fought against invoking the doctrine, even
though there was international support for its use. See supra note 130 and accompanying
text.
164. See, e.g., Damle, supra note 5, at 140; Jayachandran, Kremer & Shafter, supra note
72, at 2.
165. See Gelpern, supra note 5, at 407; Jayachandran, Kremer & Shafter, supra note 72,
at 2 (arguing that “successor governments to illegitimate regimes do not invoke the odious
debt doctrine out of fear that doing so would deprive them of necessary access to global
credit markets”).
166. See Gelpern, supra note 5, at 407.
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South Africa’s clean break from the apartheid regime in 1994 is
frequently named as an ideal case for the doctrine’s application.167 South
Africa feared that its ability to borrow in the future would be hurt if it did
not continue its debt payments and so did not raise the doctrine.168 In
another example, Nigeria incurred a significant amount of debt under
despotic regimes that were subsequently overthrown.169 Since 1986, the
country has been involved in five Paris Club restructurings without raising
the odious debt doctrine.170
This fear may ultimately be misplaced. For example, after the Civil War,
eight southern states were able to scale down or repudiate their
Reconstruction-era debts by claiming that corrupt state governments
incurred them.171 There are multiple other examples in which U.S. states
have been able to refuse payment on certain debts while maintaining a
reputation of financial reliability to future creditors.172
II. FROM THE GROUND UP:
CURRENT DOCTRINAL APPROACHES
The odious debt doctrine has gained significant traction in the scholarly
community over the last decade as countries continue to struggle to pay off
debts when there are moral and economic justifications for forgiving them.
This part looks at possible ways to establish a formal odious debt doctrine
in order to solve this dilemma. Scholars are often divided on the question
of whether the solution is in an ex post judicial mechanism or an ex ante
labeling scheme. The ex post methods first argued by Sack in the early
twentieth century are reviewed in Part II.A. Part II.B. then analyzes the
more recently developed ex ante approach.
A. The Ex Post Approach
This section first reviews tactics that can be used in the courtroom. Next,
it looks at the use of the U.N. Security Council to decide when the doctrine
should be implemented. It concludes with proposed solutions that involve
the World Bank and the IMF.

167. See Damle, supra note 5, at 139–40; Yianni & Tinkler, supra note 63, at 752.
168. See Damle, supra note 5, at 140; A. Mechele Dickerson, Insolvency Principles and
the Odious Debt Doctrine: The Missing Link in the Debate, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53,
64 (2007) (“The new South African leaders did not repudiate [their apartheid-era] debts,
most likely because they were concerned that doing so would harm the country’s ability to
attract foreign investment.”).
169. See Damle, supra note 5, at 152–54; Yianni & Tinkler, supra note 63, at 767 n.123.
170. See Yianni & Tinkler, supra note 63, at 767. Prior to its 2005 Paris Club deal, the
Nigerian legislature had resolved to repudiate its foreign debts. See Damle, supra note 5, at
152. Between 1956 and 2007, there were more than four hundred Paris Club restructuring
deals involving more than eighty indebted countries. Id. Iraq is one such example of a recent
restructuring. See supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text.
171. See Ludington, Gulati & Brophy, supra note 108, at 275–79.
172. See Michalowski & Bohoslavsky, supra note 147, at 96.
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1. Courtroom Solutions
This section first discusses traditional courtroom tactics, including public
policy considerations, the doctrine of unclean hands, and agency law
remedies. It then discusses the ability of courts to invoke the doctrine of
odious debt under customary international law.
The third prong of Sack’s formulation—requiring the creditor to have
knowledge that the loan proceeds were obtained without the consent of the
people for a purpose that does not benefit the people—raises public policy
concerns.173 Creditors may be enticed into funding a sovereign’s odious
plans through above-market interest rates or outright bribes.174 The U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 may find such action to be
criminal.175 A similar remedy under the U.K. Bribery Act of 2010 would
also be available.176 In the case of government succession, most scholars
find little authority for the doctrine beyond cases in which the lender was
bribed or otherwise corrupt.177
A debtor sovereign may also defend itself through the doctrine of unclean
hands. Buchheit, Gulati, and Thompson propose that a lender be denied
recovery if the debtor sovereign successfully pleads the unclean hands
defense.178 The defense blocks debt recovery if the lender is “tainted with
inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which [one] seeks
relief, however improper may have been the behavior of the
[sovereign].”179 When there are public policy concerns, the defense
“assumes even wider and more significant proportions.”180 This defense is
not new to the sovereign context. In Adler v. Federal Republic of
Nigeria,181 the defense was successfully used to bar recovery to the
plaintiffs who participated in a criminal scheme with Nigerian government
officials.182
An agency law remedy is possible by analogizing a sovereign’s
constituents and their government to a corporate principal and its agents.183
173. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
174. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1232.
175. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012) (requiring issuers to maintain records that fairly and
accurately reflect the issuer’s transactions and maintain a system of internal accounting
controls).
176. See Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 (UK).
177. See, e.g., King, supra note 73, at 665.
178. Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1235–37.
179. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945).
For an application in the U.K. context, see, for example, Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v.
Highland Financial Partners LP [2012] EWHC (Comm) 1278, [para. 175] (Eng.), http://
www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2012/1278.html [http://perma.cc/3DP3-SANU].
180. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. at 815.
181. 219 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 2000).
182. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1236–38 (summarizing Adler).
183. See id. at 1237–38. There is an open question as to whether the sovereign’s people
or the sovereign itself should be the principal. See Deborah A. DeMott, Agency by Analogy:
A Comment on Odious Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 161 (2007) (“The
composition of [a country’s] people will also shift over time, making the people, as opposed
the . . . state, less tractable as a principal [than the sovereign itself].”).
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Under agency law, an agent is able to bind its principal if it acts with actual
or apparent authority.184 If the agent has no such authority when binding its
principal, the principal can still act to ratify the agent’s actions.185 If the
agent, however, colludes with a third party in a manner adverse to the
principal, the principal should not have to assume the liability for that
agent’s wrongful acts.186 A principal is therefore not liable to a lender
when the lender is aware that the agent is acting for its personal benefit.187
In corporate law, a legal fiction separates the entity from its shareholders
who enjoy limited liability.188 However, this legal fiction can be abused
and ultimately removed by a court or tribunal.189 The United States argued
at the end of the Spanish-American War that the bonds secured by Cuban
revenues were actually attributable directly to Spain.190 This argument is
analogous to “veil piercing” in the corporate context.191 Under this
doctrine, an innocent lender can seek payment directly from a shareholder
when the shareholder’s wrongdoing warrants direct collection by the lender.
In the sovereign context, citizens are not protected by limited liability,
and the government itself is not directly liable for the sovereign’s debts.192
As such, a country and its citizens have unlimited liability to repay the
debts once the regime has been overthrown.193 Veil piercing in the
sovereign context would permit a lender to collect directly from a despot.194
Moreover, once a court finds that a lender knowingly funded a regime for
its odious purposes, the citizens would no longer be responsible for paying
back the debt.195
Buchheit, Gulati, and Thompson do warn that these corporate defenses
would only achieve some of the objectives of odious debt.196 Lenders
would have reason to be more cautious before lending to regimes.197
However, elements of these defenses can be difficult to prove and may not
permit a full debt cancellation.198

184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.01, 2.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
185. Id. § 4.01.
186. Id. § 5.04 cmt. c.
187. See id.; Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1243.
188. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1246–47; McDaniel, supra note
31, at 420.
189. See Ludington, Gulati & Brophy, supra note 108, at 268.
190. See supra notes 106–13 and accompanying text.
191. See Ludington, Gulati & Brophy, supra note 108, at 268.
192. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1248–50.
193. Id. at 1249.
194. See id. at 1248; Ludington, Gulati & Brophy, supra note 108, at 254.
195. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1251; Ludington, Gulati &
Brophy, supra note 108, at 254 (discussing the application of the veil-piercing argument by
the United States against Spain after the Spanish-American War).
196. Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1261.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 1251–56, 1261; Stephan, supra note 160, at 224 (“What existing national
law does not do, however, is rescind a contract when the loan contract was unwise . . . in the
absence of a national law forbidding the borrowing authority from undertaking the
transaction.” (emphasis omitted)).
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Parties generally select English or New York law in choice of law
provisions in bond indentures.199 Analyzing the doctrine under the laws
and practices of the United States and United Kingdom may not, however,
be enough. Courts may decide to integrate rules of customary international
law into their domestic law.200 However, the doctrine has not yet become
customary international law.201 Gelpern suggests that, if anything, it is “a
doctrine of public-international law aspiring to the status of customary
international law.”202
The Statute of the International Court of Justice provides an authoritative
list of sources of international law.203 These include international
conventions, international custom, general principles of law recognized by
states, and, as a secondary source, judicial rulings and teachings of industry
experts.204 To become a rule of international law, it must be invoked “in
accordance with a constant and uniform usage by the [sovereigns] in
question.”205 However, the doctrine’s limited uses in the past show
insufficient practice for a finding of customary international law.206
Professor Paul Stephan builds off of this issue in a discussion of his
“bottom-up” approach to recognizing odious debt under customary
international law.207 Under this approach, Stephan argues the doctrine
could become a part of customary international law upon a finding made by
an authoritative tribunal.208 Such a finding would also pressure courts in
the United Kingdom and New York to accept the doctrine of odious
debts.209 Unfortunately, courts in separate jurisdictions may ultimately

199. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
200. See Stephan, supra note 160, at 221. The Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino did not question New York State courts’ ability to look toward customary
international law for support, but held that federal common law would not look to it. 376
U.S. 398 (1964). “Absent application of the Sabbatino override, then, New York courts (and
presumably British ones as well) have the power to invoke international custom and
conceivably might do so with respect to the odious debt doctrine.” Stephan, supra note 160,
at 223.
201. See Emily F. Mancina, Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God: Resurrecting the
Odious Debt Doctrine in International Law, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1239, 1252
(2004) (“[The odious debt doctrine] does not exist under any treaties, nor does it exist in
state practice, as no state has explicitly invoked it and prevailed by raising the doctrine as a
defense to a legal obligation to repay its debts.”); Paulus, supra note 72, at 91.
202. Anna Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 85 (2007) (noting
odious debt lacks sufficient state practice and opinio juris).
203. See Statute of International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, http://www.
icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTER_II [http://perma.cc/8J2M54CT].
204. Id.
205. Asylum (Colom./Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276 (Nov. 20).
206. See Yianni & Tinkler, supra note 63, at 768.
207. See Stephan, supra note 160, at 229–31.
208. Id. at 229. It is unlikely, however, that a single holding by an international tribunal
would be sufficient to establish a customary law. See Gelpern, supra note 202, at 85 (“To
qualify as custom, a legal norm traditionally must ‘harden’ through general, consistent
practice of states over time, which must be ‘accepted as law’—that is, experienced as
binding and legal, rather than habitual, discretionary, or accidental.”).
209. See Stephan, supra note 160, at 229.
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apply the doctrine in different circumstances, creating an inconsistency in
its application.210
Because the last quasi application of the odious debt doctrine occurred
during the Tinoco Arbitration nearly a century ago, its adoption would
likely shock the sovereign debt market, increasing legal risks.211 Further,
there is no solid definition of odious debt in customary international law.212
Courts could limit the doctrine’s application to sovereigns subject to
sanctions of the Security Council.213 Alternatively, courts could create a
presumption of odiousness when sufficient repression and instances of
murder are seen.214
Another issue arises in waiting for customary international law to
develop in tribunals: most sovereign debt restructurings do not involve any
arbitration or litigation.215 Sovereign debtors have generally used tools
available in the official sector to resolve debt issues.216 Negotiations
between a sovereign and its bondholders may result in a partial debt
cancellation, longer debt maturities, or lower interest rates.217 Sovereigns
participating in renegotiations of their debt will not, however, use the
doctrine as an express reason for requesting relief.218 Moreover, partial
debt cancellation does not fulfill the moral or economic justifications for the
doctrine. Despotic leaders may still obtain loans for odious uses, and
sovereigns may nonetheless be faced with outstanding debt obligations that
they are unable to pay.
2. The U.N. Security Council
After the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, the U.N. Security Council
froze all Iraqi assets held by U.N. member nations.219 It also immunized all
Iraqi wealth from oil and gas production, an industry representing more
than 75 percent of Iraq’s economy at the time, from creditors’ grasps.220
As evidenced by this example, the U.N. Security Council already has a
significant amount of authority.221 Under the U.N. Charter, the Security
210. See id.
211. See id. at 229. See generally Great Britain v. Costa Rica, 1 R.I.A.A. 371 (1923).
212. See Michalowski & Bohoslavsky, supra note 147, at 63; Stephan, supra note 160, at
230 (“A judge seeking to . . . determine what qualifies as odious would find a wealth of
opinion but no clear and determinant core.”).
213. See Stephan, supra note 160, at 230.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 218.
216. See Gelpern, supra note 5, at 400. For example, the U.N. Security Council required
its member nations to transfer all Iraqi assets in their jurisdictions to a specially designated
development fund. See id. at 395. Iraq was subsequently able to reduce its debt obligations
through renegotiations with Paris Club bondholders. See id. at 402.
217. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 24, at 7–8.
218. See generally supra Part I.C.2.
219. See supra note 216.
220. See S.C. Res. 1483, ¶ 22 (May 22, 2003), http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/pdf/
resolution1483_iraq_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/4EHV-RN82]; Gelpern, supra note 5, at 394–
96.
221. See Stephan, supra note 160, at 227.
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Council can impose economic sanctions on abusive regimes when that
abuse threatens international order.222 As such, it could order member
states not to recognize the debts incurred by odious regimes.223
While states are obligated to carry out Security Council resolutions, the
resolutions do not automatically translate into binding domestic law.224
The Security Council also cannot act without consensus among all of its
permanent members—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.225 As such, leaving decisions of odious debt to the Security
Council may have “little practical significance.”226
3. World Bank and IMF Solutions
Some experts believe that the World Bank or IMF may be better suited to
offer institutional remedies for the doctrine.227 This section looks at the
solutions involving the World Bank and IMF in turn. It then looks at
criticisms of both approaches.
Unlike the Security Council, a Board of Governors governs the World
Bank, and voting is done by subscription.228 The purpose of the World
Bank, in part, is to “assist in the reconstruction and development of
territories of members by facilitating the investment of capital for
The World Bank has been revisiting its
productive purposes.”229
anticorruption efforts over the last decade.230 The Bank is already in the
practice of categorizing corrupt states and monitoring corruption and budget
transparency.231 Continuing efforts could allow the World Bank to play a
role in monitoring the use of debt funds.232 The act of categorizing
governments could also assist in developing an ex ante approach to odious
debt.233
While there are procedural efficiency justifications to promoting the
World Bank’s role in evaluating potential odious debt claims, the Bank
222. See U.N. Charter arts. 39–51, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ [http://
perma.cc/3RLE-3HC9].
223. See Stephan, supra note 160, at 227.
224. See id. (“National governments may cite a Security Council resolution as a basis for
adopting a domestic law, but a refusal to carry out a resolution may result only in another
resolution.”).
225. See U.N. Charter arts. 23(1), 27(3).
226. Stephan, supra note 160, at 227.
227. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 122, at 104 (“For policing systematic plundering, the
most logical decisionmaker would be either the World Bank or the IMF . . . .”); Ginsburg &
Ulen, supra note 149, at 133 (“We believe the IMF and World Bank are better vehicles for
addressing the odious debt problem than the United Nations.”).
228. See Int’l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev. [IBRD], Articles of Agreement, art. V,
§§ 2–3 (Dec. 27, 1945), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrdarticlesofagreement.pdf [http://perma.cc/5P8R-MJB7].
229. Id. art. I.
230. See Ben-Shahar & Gulati, supra note 131, at 72; Damle, supra note 5, at 154.
231. See Corruption Measurement, WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/W9P7QIN
6M0 (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/J3M6-LXBY]; see also Damle, supra note
5, at 154; Feinerman, supra note 59, at 209.
232. See Ben-Shahar & Gulati, supra note 131, at 72.
233. See infra Part II.B.
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itself does not support the doctrine.234 The World Bank criticizes it for the
lack of support found in customary international law and suggests a
different approach of improved lending and borrowing practices.235 The
World Bank also advocates debt reduction rather than debt forgiveness.236
The IMF is also governed by a Board of Governors with voting done by
subscription.237 The IMF conducts regular financial reviews of its
members.238 It arguably collects better financial data about a sovereign
than other outside parties and would likely uncover fund misappropriations
that occur.239 If the IMF took a role in the identification of odious debt, it
could deny IMF funds to the odious regimes and declare any previous debts
unenforceable. The IMF could also use its review process to establish an ex
ante mechanism for labeling odious regimes.240 In 2000, a U.S. advisory
commission recommended a similar mechanism in a report on reforming
international financial institutions.241 It recommended that confirming the
soundness of a country’s public finance policies should be a prerequisite for
IMF bailout funds during a crisis.242
The IMF has also proposed the Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism243 (SDRM). The SDRM was proposed as a framework to
provide debtor countries and their creditors with incentives to quickly come
to a restructuring agreement in an economically efficient manner.244 The
mechanism was based on four central bankruptcy principles:
(1) prevent creditors from blocking renegotiations by seeking
repayment through the court system;
(2) encourage creditors to provide capital to assist with the
debtor country’s financing needs;
(3) remove the collective action problem by binding minority
creditors, once approved by a sufficient majority; and

234. See Vikram Nehru & Mark Thomas, The Concept of Odious Debt: Some
Considerations 23 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. WPS4676, 2008).
235. See id. at 26–38.
236. See Michalowski & Bohoslavsky, supra note 147, at 106; Nehru & Thomas, supra
note 234, at 35.
237. Int’l Monetary Fund [IMF], Articles of Agreement of the IMF, art. 12, § 5
[hereinafter Articles of Agreement of the IMF], https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/
[http://perma.cc/QF96-CDQT].
238. See id. art. IV; Bolton & Skeel, supra note 122, at 104.
239. See Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a
Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured?, 53 EMORY L.J. 763, 809 (2004); Bolton
& Skeel, supra note 122, at 104.
240. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 122, at 104–05.
241. See id.
242. See id. at 105.
243. See Krueger, supra note 56.
244. See IMF, IMF Board Discusses Possible Features of Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism, PIN No. 03/06 (2003) [hereinafter IMF Board Discusses Possible Features],
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2003/pn0306.htm
[http://perma.cc/9U32-ZAHR].
Most directors of the IMF “agreed that an amendment of the [IMF’s] Articles would provide
the most appropriate vehicle for the establishment of the SDRM.” Id.
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(4) provide some guarantee that the debtor would act responsibly
during the process.245
Under the SDRM, authority would be given to a Sovereign Debt Dispute
Resolution Forum (SDDRF) to rule on legal challenges to specific loans.246
The SDDRF would be an independent body created under the IMF Articles
of Agreement.247 If issues arise that risk undermining a debtor sovereign’s
restructuring process, the SDDRF could provide a stay in the creditors’
collection efforts.248 In addition to dealing with traditional restructuring
issues, the SDRM could permit sovereigns to petition the SDDRF to allow
cancellation of odious debt.249
The SDRM faced immediate criticism.250 The private sector in the
United States and abroad was critical of the proposal to limit individual
investors’ rights and perhaps increase the frequency of restructurings.251
Creditors were concerned that the proposal was merely a power grab by the
IMF and criticized it for favoring debtor countries.252 Some directors of the
IMF Executive Board feared the SDRM’s objectives actually went beyond
They also questioned the
the scope of the IMF’s purposes.253
appropriateness of amending the Articles of Agreement to allow for the
creation of the new mechanism.254
Krueger argued that IMF involvement was “essential” to the SDRM’s
success.255 She claimed that the IMF was the “most effective channel
through which the international community can reach a judgment on the
sustainability of a country’s debt and of its economic policies.”256 She did
admit, however, that the IMF would require some outside support in
verifying creditor claims and occasionally adjudicating disputes among
creditors and/or debtors.257

245. See Krueger, supra note 56. The fourth element was later removed from the IMF’s
proposal. See IMF, Report of the Managing Director to the International Monetary and
Financial Committee on the IMF’s Policy Agenda 16–17 (Apr. 2003) [hereinafter IMF
Policy Agenda], http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/2003/041103.pdf [http://perma.cc/
DU6N-XM4Z].
246. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 239, at 779; IMF Board Discusses Possible
Features, supra note 244.
247. See IMF Board Discusses Possible Features, supra note 244.
248. See id.
249. See Bradley N. Lewis, Restructuring the Odious Debt Exception, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J.
297, 337–39 (2007).
250. See, e.g., Hagan, supra note 56, at 391, 392 n.251 (discussing opposition from the
United States and the private sector).
251. See id. at 392–93.
252. See Gelpern, supra note 5, at 398; Hagan, supra note 56, at 345 (observing that “for
an institution that is already perceived by many as being excessively powerful, concerns
have been expressed about any reform that would give it any further authority”).
253. See IMF Board Discusses Possible Features, supra note 244.
254. See id.
255. Krueger, supra note 56.
256. Id.
257. See id.
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Two years after its proposal, the IMF acknowledged a lack of sufficient
support by member nations and abandoned the project.258 Just before being
shelved in 2003, John Snow, then-U.S. Treasury Secretary, argued that the
use of collective action clauses, not the SDRM, was the correct method for
resolving restructuring issues.259 Given the United States’s presence in the
IMF, it would be impossible to implement an SDRM-like infrastructure
without U.S. support.260 Moreover, it would be difficult to implement any
restructuring mechanism—with or without the IMF—without U.S.
support.261
While the World Bank and IMF are structured in a way to provide a more
equal voting process than the Security Council, the SDRM example above
shows that the organizations are not free from political sway.262 In
particular, Patrick Bolton and David A. Skeel, Jr. suggest that the IMF has
“been driven more by political pressures by the United States or other G-7
members than by the economics of the crisis in question.”263 After all, the
United States’s voting shares are more than double that of the next highest
voting member in the World Bank and almost three times that of the next
highest voting member in the IMF.264 Both organizations are also subject
to an institutional bias. As lenders themselves, both organizations have
been accused of consciously financing oppressive governments that
ultimately use the funds to “affirmatively harm” their citizens.265 The IMF
in particular was criticized for trying to make restructurings easier through
the SDRM and lowering the frequency with which the IMF would have to
provide financial support.266
258. See IMF Policy Agenda, supra note 245. More than 75 percent of voting power
supported the SDRM, but 85 percent is necessary under the IMF’s Articles of Amendment.
See Articles of Agreement of the IMF, supra note 237, art. 28; Jack Boorman, Special
Advisor to the Managing Dir., IMF, Speech: Dealing Justly with Debt (Apr. 30, 2003),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2003/043003.htm [http://perma.cc/SC4R-WD53].
259. See John W. Snow, U.S. Sec’y of Treasury, Statement at the Meeting of the
International Monetary and Financial Committee (Apr. 12, 2003), http://www.imf.org/
external/spring/2003/imfc/state/eng/usa.htm (“The source of [current restructuring] problems
lies in the relationships and agreements of debtors and their creditors. It is these parties, not
an international organization, that must assume responsibility for the solution.”)
[http://perma.cc/D85V-6YJX].
260. See Sedlak, supra note 38, at 1484. The United States holds more than 15 percent of
voting shares and thus has de facto veto power in the IMF. See IMF Members’ Quotas and
Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors, IMF (Sept. 18, 2015) [hereinafter IMF
Members’ Quotas and Voting Power], http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.
aspx [http://perma.cc/7TED-LF7B].
261. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Odious Debt, and the
Politics of Debt Relief, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 259 (2007) (“It is difficult to
imagine the adoption of . . . an odious debt doctrine . . . without America’s active support.”).
262. See Feinerman, supra note 59, at 215; Rasmussen, supra note 261, at 259.
263. Bolton & Skeel, supra note 239, at 810.
264. See Subscriptions and Voting Power of Member Countries, IBRD,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-1215524804501/IBRD
CountryVotingTable.pdf (last updated Oct. 1, 2015) [http://perma.cc/2UTP-HB3R]; IMF
Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, supra note 260.
265. Dickerson, supra note 168, at 56.
266. See A Better Way to Go Bust, ECONOMIST (Jan. 30, 2003), http://www.economist.
com/node/1560022 (describing critics’ worry that the IMF had a hidden agenda to remove
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Even if the World Bank and the IMF were to overcome the difficulties
discussed above, and fully accept the doctrine, there is a question of what
rule of law they would each utilize in making their decisions. As already
discussed, customary international law is insufficient.267 The IMF would
likely have to amend its Articles even to establish the SDRM.268 The
SDDRF (or an institutional remedy created by the World Bank) would have
to adopt some rules for evaluating use of funds.269 It would also need to
have some legal authority to bind states and creditors.270
Each of the proposed solutions for use outside of the courtroom lacks
either international support or an established institution to implement the
proposal—or both. Moreover, each of these proposed solutions share one
shortcoming: by the time they can be utilized, the damage has already been
done; the despot has already left the sovereign with large debt obligations
that never benefitted the people. Other strategies try to account for this
inherent problem with the ex post approach.
B. The Ex Ante Approach
Ex ante approaches are applied before a bond has been issued. They seek
to cut off financing before much of the financial hardship can be created.
The alternative way to approach this problem is from an ex post perspective
by excusing the debts of a sovereign once its despotic regime has been
disposed but the financial hardship that it caused remains. This section first
discusses a labeling mechanism proposed by ex ante proponents. It then
discusses a relatively new contractual solution that has been proposed to
ease the collective action problem in corporate defaults and, more recently,
in sovereign defaults.
1. The Labeling Regime
Proponents of an ex ante approach diverge from Sack’s model by seeking
to identify odious regimes before they are able to issue bonds.271 By
labeling a regime “odious,” potential creditors would effectively be put on
notice that a successor government could repudiate the debts of its
predecessor.272 An ex ante approach would also incentivize creditors to

their own bailout support) [http://perma.cc/JH2G-KL3C]. But see Hagan, supra note 56, at
393 (arguing that the intent of the IMF was to provide a restructuring framework, not replace
their financial support).
267. See supra Part II.A.1.
268. See supra note 244.
269. The SDDRF would have used the substantive law of the relevant nation in its
dispute. See Hagan, supra note 56, at 383. However, there is no such law for evaluating
what constitutes odious debt. See generally Part I.B.2.
270. See Hagan, supra note 56, at 386 (“[T]he binding effect of such actions assumes that
all member countries have taken the necessary steps to ensure that the new treaty obligations
conferring such powers on the [SDDRF] are given full legal effect in their territory.”).
271. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1226.
272. See Jayachandran, Kremer & Shafter, supra note 72, at 5; Wyler, supra note 35, at
949.
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focus on due diligence.273 This section first looks at the basics of the
regime. It then discusses which institution should be responsible for
making ex ante labeling decisions.
a. Restricting Funds to Odious Regimes
Under the labeling regime, an international organization would label
governments as “odious-debt prone.”274 Creditors would petition the
organization for a ruling on a potential debtor sovereign based on the
debtor’s proposed use of funds and the creditor’s due diligence model.275 If
approved by the organization, the debt would remain enforceable in the
event of a regime change.276
Only debts incurred by governments given the odious-prone designation
would be subject to possible cancellation.277 Once a designation has been
given, the creditor would be responsible for monitoring the use of funds.278
If the creditor fails to make a good faith effort with its monitoring
obligations and the funds are used for illegitimate purposes, the debt would
be forgiven if the despotic regime then falls.279
Placing the burden of proof on the creditor alleviates some stress on the
debtor, which is generally in desperate need of capital once a despotic
regime has been overthrown.280 The shift also makes the creditor’s duty
more onerous.281 This could lead the capital markets to tighten and be more
difficult to maneuver.282 Ultimately, this would negatively impact regimes
that have been deemed odious-prone, even if the regimes ultimately use
bond proceeds for legitimate purposes.283 Taft effectively rejected this
labeling approach in his Tinoco ruling for similar reasons.284
Creditors who are effectively on notice will scrutinize a regime’s debt
offering more heavily.285 As such, the ex ante labeling mechanism has the
effect of attempting to halt lending to a despotic regime before it even

273. See Jayachandran, Kremer & Shafter, supra note 72, at 19–22.
274. See id. at 19.
275. See id.
276. See id. at 20.
277. See id. at 19.
278. See id. at 20.
279. See id. at 20–21.
280. See Wyler, supra note 35, at 976.
281. See id. at 976–77.
282. See id. at 980–81.
283. Regimes that have been labeled as odious-prone regimes may, for example, have
their development slowed through an inability to access capital to fund necessary
infrastructure projects. See id.
284. See Ludington, Gulati & Brophy, supra note 108, at 265–66 (“[A]ssuming that Taft
wanted to make it easy for creditors to lend, he probably would not have put the burden on
them to investigate ex ante whether a government was adequately democratic, or justify the
‘legitimacy’ of a regime ex post.”).
285. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 122, at 99 (“[T]he threat of subsequent annulment
would discipline potential lenders, encouraging them not to lend too recklessly to odious
regimes.”).
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starts.286 This could ultimately expedite the downfall of the authoritative
government.287 However, it could also cut off vital financing for the
country.288 When it does not cut off financing, it could otherwise eliminate
the availability of market interest rate debt instruments.289 The approach
itself has several risks and shortcomings; these are amplified by the lack of
a labeling apparatus.
b. Creating a Labeling Institution
Labeling of a sovereign as odious-prone is subjective in nature.290 As
such, the institution making ex ante determinations would need to be
composed of a group with similar viewpoints, allowing it to form a
consensus regarding what is odious.291
The labeling could occur under the auspices of the U.S. executive
branch.292 However, the executive would be limited to ruling on U.S.governed bonds, and the United States does not have as dominant role in
global capital markets as it once did.293 The U.N. is a possible solution, but
it is not ideal. Its members represent a diverse group of players with varied
opinions on what may or may not be odious.294 The G-7 or Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development295 (OECD) countries could
spearhead the effort.296 The groups both exist for economic and financial
purposes, however, and may not wish to involve themselves in such a
politically driven endeavor.297
286. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1226 (“It is the financial
equivalent of what oncologists call ‘starving the tumor.’”).
287. See id. at 1227.
288. See id. This problem may be exacerbated when the regime uses the sovereign’s
income for despotic purposes, but uses debt proceeds for legitimate purposes.
289. See Jayachandran, Kremer & Shafter, supra note 72, at 2.
290. See id. at 22. The subjective element is on the part of the labeling institution rather
than on the lender who, under the Sackian model, must show he was not subjectively aware
of the odious use of funds. See id. at 18.
291. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 122, at 105; Jayachandran, Kremer & Shafter, supra
note 72, at 22.
292. See Jonathan Shafter, The Due Diligence Model: An Executive Approach to Odious
Debt Reform, 32 N.C. J. INT’L. & COM. REG. 669, 691–94 (2007). The U.S. judiciary is less
likely to weigh in as it would require reallocation of some foreign affairs power from the
executive branch. See id. at 684.
293. See id. at 692–694. Only 36 percent of bonds were U.S.-dollar denominated at the
end of 2006. Id. at 693.
294. See Jayachandran, Kremer & Shafter, supra note 72, at 22. However, as noted
above, the Security Council already has power to make similar designations. See Ben-Shahar
& Gulati, supra note 131, at 56.
295. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, established to run
the Marshall Plan at the end of World War II, currently has thirty-four members and works
toward promoting economically and socially sound policies across the world. See History,
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., http://www.oecd.org/about/history/ (last visited
Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/EZ3N-NLLK]; About the OECD, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., http://www.oecd.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.
cc/PG8W-ZYRM].
296. See Jayachandran, Kremer & Shafter, supra note 72, at 23.
297. See id. at 23 n.29.

2015]

A STORY OF DEBT GONE WRONG

755

An institutional labeling mechanism would have several shortcomings.
Like the ex post approach, it would need to find authority upon which to
act. As mentioned above, there is no internationally recognized definition
of odious debt.298 Consequently, the labeling institution would need to
establish its own criteria for evaluating governments.299 The untested
institution and lack of precedent defining odious debt would also increase
the investment risk for the parties involved. Additionally, individual
bondholders may lack adequate incentive to request the labeling of a
sovereign prior to lending.300
2. The Contractual Solution
Perhaps the solution is not in spotting despotic regimes before they start
spending debt proceeds, but in spotting them before they finish using the
funds. Professors Yankov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade, and Marcel Kahan
propose the creation of a “supertrustee” role in the corporate context
wherein the trustee would be given significantly more authority than it is
currently given under a trust indenture.301 This arrangement emphasizes
increased monitoring duties.302 This section first describes the trustee’s
traditional role. It then describes the proposed monitoring duty. Next, it
describes the supertrustee’s enforcement mechanisms. Then, it discusses
the recourse available to bondholders under the doctrine before describing
the proposed supertrustee compensation. It concludes by discussing
barriers to the supertrustee model and the ideal circumstances for its
adoption.
In a traditional corporate context, the trustee’s role is very limited prior to
default.303 The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 requires the appointment of an
indenture trustee for each corporate bond.304 The trustee ensures debtor
compliance with the indenture.305 It generally does so by requiring the
debtor to issue an annual compliance certificate to the trustee.306 The
trustee “may conclusively rely on” the certificates so that no extra due
diligence is required.307

298. See generally supra Part I.B.2.
299. See Ginsburg & Ulen, supra note 149, at 120–21.
300. A collective action problem can result when individual bondholders lack incentive to
do something that will benefit the entire bondholder class. See Sedlak, supra note 38, at
1492.
301. See Amihud, Garbade & Kahan, supra note 13, at 451. More recently, Robert Auray
proposed the use of a supertrustee for trust indentures in a sovereign context. See generally
Robert Auray, In Bonds We Trustee: A New Contractual Mechanism to Improve Sovereign
Bond Restructurings, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 899 (2013). Auray proposed the adoption of a
supertrustee in the sovereign bond context that would monitor, negotiate restructurings, and
coordinate bondholders during a default. Id. at 931–34.
302. See Amihud, Garbade & Kahan, supra note 13, at 472–74.
303. See McDaniel, supra note 31, at 430.
304. See Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(a)(1) (2012).
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. Id. § 77ooo(a)(2); see also McDaniel, supra note 31, at 430.
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Bond ownership is often highly dispersed, and the bonds themselves are
readily transferable.308 As a result, it becomes difficult for creditors to
obtain the consent of bondholders in the event an amendment or waiver is
Thus, a collective action problem results:
individual
needed.309
bondholders generally have a relatively small cut of the overall outstanding
balance and lack incentive to monitor debtor compliance and take positive
steps toward resolving any problems.310
This collective action problem would be resolved in the corporate context
by appointing a supertrustee in the trust indenture.311 Like a standard
indenture trustee, the supertrustee would act on behalf of the
bondholders.312 As such, it would be in the company’s self-interest to
select a credible supertrustee that bondholders would approve of, to reduce
risk and acquire more favorable lending terms.313
The supertrustee’s defining task is its duty to monitor the borrower’s
compliance with the covenants in the indenture.314 Unlike a traditional
trustee that relies on certificates issued by the borrower for compliance with
the indenture’s terms and covenants, the supertrustee would be
continuously engaged in independent monitoring.315 A traditional trustee
lacks a contractual obligation to monitor the debtor.316 Accordingly, the
new contractual arrangement would need to be laid out in the indenture.
The supertrustee’s duty would be to “engage in the type and intensity of
monitoring which a reasonable lender in the private debt market would
engage in under similar circumstances.”317
The supertrustee would also have the ability to renegotiate bond
covenants.318 Trustees in the United States are generally only permitted to
make technical amendments without bondholder consent.319 Trustees in the
United Kingdom are currently allowed some discretion to renegotiate
nonmaterially prejudicial trust deed terms that do not result in substantial,
permanent changes.320 As a result of the stricter covenants and increased
monitoring that would occur under the supertrustee model, renegotiations of
key financial terms should occur less frequently.321 Consequently, the
proposed corporate model does not require the supertrustee to have the
power to renegotiate core financial terms.322 Doing so, however, could ease

308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text.
See Amihud, Garbade & Kahan, supra note 13, at 459–60.
See id. at 459.
See id. at 471.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 472–74.
See id. at 473.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 474.
See id.
See id. at 477–78.
See id. at 475.
See id. at 474.

2015]

A STORY OF DEBT GONE WRONG

757

collective action and holdout problems.323 Authors Amihud, Garbade, and
Kahan propose that the corporate issuer have the option, but not the
obligation, to allocate this power to the supertrustee.324
An indenture trustee generally holds the same enforcement capacity as
the bondholders and is obliged to follow instructions from the majority-ininterest bondholders.325 In the event of a material covenant breach under
English law, the trustee must also seek bondholder approval for
amendments.326 The power to enforce the indenture and seek amendments
after a material breach under the proposed model would stay exclusively
with the supertrustee, absent a default by the company.327 Given its
ongoing monitoring obligations, the supertrustee would be in a better
position to make these enforcement decisions.328
Only bondholders representing a material portion of the bonds (e.g., 10
percent), in aggregate, would be allowed to sue the supertrustee for a breach
of its fiduciary duties.329 The supertrustee would not be liable to the
bondholders for poor decisions unless it acted in bad faith or it dealt with an
irreconcilable conflict of interest—known as self-dealing in the corporate
context.330 Monetary liability of the supertrustee would be limited in the
absence of willful, bad faith, or reckless actions.331
Amihud, Garbade, and Kahan also suggest limiting the bondholders’
ability to replace the supertrustee.332 The indenture could limit removal of
the trustee to “for cause” reasons, such as acting in bad faith.333
Alternatively, it could allow for the periodic election or reelection of the
supertrustee, with limitations set by the company as to possible trustees.334
The supertrustee’s compensation would be set when appointed by the
issuer and would only be amendable by approval of the bondholders.335
The compensation would need to be higher than standard indenture trustee
fees in order to reflect the added cost of continuous monitoring.336 It would
also need to be positively correlated to increases in bond value in order to
incentivize the supertrustee to complete its duties effectively.337
Bondholders must also have adequate incentive to pay the supertrustee
under a compensation structure that is significantly higher than that of the
323. See id. at 475.
324. Id. at 475–76.
325. See id. at 476–77; Revised Model Simplified Indenture, supra note 32, at 1137.
326. See Amihud, Garbade & Kahan, supra note 13, at 477 n.105.
327. See id. at 476.
328. See id.
329. See id. at 473.
330. See id. at 478. The authors analogize this limited recourse to the “business judgment
rule” to which a board of directors is subject. Id.
331. See id. at 473–74.
332. See id. at 471.
333. See id. at 472.
334. See id.
335. See id. at 479.
336. See id.
337. See id. at 480. This could be done through a set of derivative securities that has a
value negatively correlated to the spread between the bond and U.S. Treasury debt yields.
See id.
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standard indenture trustee.338 Higher compensation for the supertrustee
could be justified by establishing a credible reputation for monitoring
issuers.339 As mentioned above, bondholders lack incentive to monitor a
relatively small bond investment.340 They will have a greater incentive to
monitor a supertrustee who is representing them on multiple issues.341
The supertrustee model would face barriers. In particular, the Trust
Indenture Act currently allows trustees to rely on debtor compliance
certificates.342
It also requires unanimous bondholder consent to
amendments of major terms under the indenture.343 Barriers aside, the
supertrustee would be most beneficial to relatively large, long-term debt
issuances that could take advantage of economies of scale.344 In order to
take full advantage of the supertrustee model, it should be used for less than
creditworthy or financially distressed borrowers where the supertrustee
would likely need to play a more active role.345
III. MEETING IN THE MIDDLE:
A SOLUTION THROUGH MONITORING
Since the odious debt doctrine’s introduction in the early twentieth
century, courts have yet to directly invoke it.346 Sack envisioned an
institution reviewing pleas for debt relief by sovereigns newly freed from
despotic rulers.347 Recent scholars have envisioned the prevention of
lending to despotic regimes altogether.348 Even with a growing foundation
of scholarly work on the doctrine, it remains largely unused and even feared
by countries that present textbook cases for its application.349
This part first addresses the insufficiencies that current approaches
cannot overcome. It next proposes an intermediate solution that resolves
some of the shortcomings of current approaches. It then dissects some
criticisms that this proposed solution will likely face.
A. Insufficiencies with Current Proposals
Current approaches to dealing with odious debt can be categorized by
solutions that limit funding ex ante and provide relief ex post. Each has
338. See id. at 479.
339. See id. at 481, 484–85.
340. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
341. See id. at 482–83.
342. See Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(a) (2012); Amihud, Garbade &
Kahan, supra note 13, at 485. This barrier can be overcome because “even though the Trust
Indenture Act creates a presumption that the indenture trustee can rely conclusively on
compliance certificates provided by the company, the bond indenture can provide that the
indenture trustee may not rely on such certificates.” Amihud, Garbade & Kahan, supra note
13, at 486 (emphasis omitted).
343. See 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(a); Amihud, Garbade & Kahan, supra note 13, at 487–88.
344. See Amihud, Garbade & Kahan, supra note 13, at 490.
345. See id. at 491.
346. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
347. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
348. See generally supra Part II.B.
349. See supra Part I.C.2.
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inherent shortcomings. This section breaks down the inadequacies of each
approach in turn.
The labeling mechanism proposed by some scholars is idealistic, but not
practical. Bonds are issued to a large number of retail investors who
individually lack the incentive to pursue an ex ante determination prior to
purchasing a sovereign’s bonds.350 Like the collective action problem
caused by NML Capital,351 individual bondholders cannot afford significant
pre-lending due diligence such as paying an institution to label each
borrower they come across.352
Additionally, not all of a bond issuance will necessarily be used odiously.
Denying capital to an odious-labeled country will stifle economic growth in
the country while it is under the despotic regime’s rule. This may
accelerate the timeline in which the regime will be overthrown, but it will
do so by burdening citizens of the sovereign.
To gain support for an ex ante approach, potential users must trust that
the system will be able to identify odious and non-odious regimes correctly.
This would not be an easy task. Regimes that incur odious debts may
actually start out as legitimate governments. It is not unthinkable that a
democratically appointed government could receive a green light from the
labeling institution and then turn odious soon after.353
There is also no institution capable of labeling the regimes at present.354
The World Bank already monitors foreign government corruption levels,
but this is just one part of the problem.355 If a new institution were
established, it would require significant capital to start. Major economic
players and contributors to other international institutions, such as the IMF
and World Bank, would be likely capital providers. Yet, the United States,
which is a large capital contributor to these institutions, is skeptical of any
institutional remedy for sovereign debt-related issues.356 Creditors are
likely to be skeptical of the untested approach.
The ex post judicial mechanism was formulated by Sack357 and sits on
the opposite end of the spectrum from the ex ante approach. Unlike the ex
ante method, this approach is entirely debtor centric. It provides relief for
the debtor country, but leaves the bondholders empty-handed.358 Where the
labeling mechanism may put creditors on notice beforehand or keep
bondholders from actually acquiring a sovereign’s debt, the ex post
approach simply forgives the debt without consideration to the bondholders.
Perhaps under Sack’s third prong the bondholders should be left emptyhanded because they were aware that the proceeds would be used for odious
350. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text.
352. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
353. The Tinoco regime actually gained support from citizens when it initially took
office. See Great Britain v. Costa Rica, 1 R.I.A.A. 371, 378–79 (1923).
354. See generally Part II.B.
355. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 259–61 and accompanying text.
357. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
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purposes.359 However, this argument is not as simple with respect to
bondholders as it is with respect to traditional creditors. Proving that all
bondholders meet the third prong would be a near impossible task, leading
to an ex post doctrinal approach with no actual application. If the third
prong was waived, sovereigns could receive the relief they demand, but
innocent bondholders would be out of luck. Bondholders would have a
reason to be resentful toward the system and skeptical toward lending to
other regimes in the future.
The approach provides relief to debtor countries by allowing them to
escape a potential debt trap. The sovereigns are able to finance
infrastructure projects and economic development in lieu of making interest
and principal payments on previously incurred debts. However, an ex post
approach cannot remedy the significant damage already caused; bond
proceeds have already been used to suppress a sovereign’s people or to
assist a despotic leader in its escape.
B. Reforming the Roles of the
Traditional Trustee and Fiscal Agent
Ex post solutions provide relief to sovereigns, but come too late to help
bondholders. Ex ante solutions help bondholders, but risk denying
sovereigns needed financing altogether. The needs of both the debtor and
the creditors can be met by bridging the gap between these two approaches.
A new solution that adopts key elements of the supertrustee model
discussed in Part II may resolve the shortcomings of the current
approaches.360
This Note proposes the apportionment of additional powers to the
traditional bond trustee or fiscal agent in sovereign bond offerings.361 It
uses the term “monitoring agent” to refer to a trustee or fiscal agent with
amplified powers, which this Note argues provides a solution to the odious
debt problem. The monitoring agent solution will work best under an
indenture trustee arrangement, but it may also have some application in a
fiscal agency arrangement.362
This section first addresses the appointment of the monitoring agent.
Next, it delves into the agent’s increased responsibilities before discussing
359. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. This third prong has faced some criticism
because requiring the lender have positive knowledge of the bond’s usage permits the lender
to be willfully ignorant. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
360. Similarities may be drawn between this Note’s proposed solution for odious debt and
Auray’s sovereign debt solution discussed supra note 301. The solution proposed in this
Note, however, limits the application to monitoring for odious uses of bond proceeds, does
not allow the trustee to conduct renegotiations, and allows for a limited application under
fiscal agency arrangements.
361. The proposed solution does not discuss odious uses of individual loans. As
discussed above, individual lenders traditionally hold loans. See supra note 18 and
accompanying text. In this context, lenders are more financially incentivized to monitor
compliance with the terms of the loan and less at risk for collective action problems.
362. Ideally, sovereign bonds would be governed by a trust indenture with an appointed
monitoring agent. However, holders of a bond issued under a fiscal agency agreement can
nonetheless benefit from the monitoring agent model. See infra Part III.B.5.
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how to keep the agent accountable to the bondholders. It then proposes a
compensation structure for the monitoring agent. Next, it looks at features
of the proposal that will be different under the fiscal agency agreement.
Finally, it discusses situations in which the monitoring agent would be most
effective.
1. Appointing a New Monitoring Agent
The sovereign debtor should appoint the initial monitoring agent.363 The
debtor would be incentivized to appoint a credible agent in order to lower
the risk associated with its offering. Under a trust indenture, the monitoring
agent should be subject to reelection every five years by the bondholders.364
This added security to the bondholders would permit them to replace an
agent that is neglecting its monitoring duties without having to go through
the formal replacement process provided for in the trust indenture.365 It
would also put pressure on the agent to make a diligent monitoring effort.
The sovereign should be allowed to limit the options for replacement agents
by including a list of permitted agents in its offering documents.366
Providing the sovereign with this capability would ensure it is not
blindsided by a new monitoring agent that it fears does not fairly represent
its interests.
There are institutional barriers to replacing monitoring agents. A fiveyear gap between elections would provide some level of security to the
agent so it is willing to build the infrastructure necessary to maintain its
monitoring efforts. A changeover of monitoring agents would be expensive
because the new agent would lack the established processes of the previous
agent. As such, it is unlikely that a change in monitoring agents would
occur for a superficial reason.
2. Allocating Additional Responsibilities
The monitoring agent would need to ensure debt proceeds are used in an
appropriate manner. The agent would be in charge of continuous
monitoring and should be granted the authority to accelerate bonds once the
issuer has breached its covenants on the use of proceeds. This delegation of
powers permits the bondholders to maintain oversight and have the ability
to act if the monitoring agent fails to act properly.
The monitoring agent’s primary duty would be to monitor the use of
proceeds. Limitations on the use of funds would be included in the
underlying document. The sovereign would covenant not to use or allow
funds to be used for any fraudulent, illegal, or corrupt purposes, or for any

363. This approach is proposed in the corporate context discussed supra note 311 and
accompanying text.
364. The monitoring agent would not be subject to reelection under the fiscal agency
agreement. See infra Part III.B.5.
365. See supra notes 332–34 and accompanying text.
366. See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
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purpose that subjugates its people.367 It is unlikely that sovereigns will
reject these covenants because doing so may imply odious intent.
The debtor sovereign would provide periodic reporting to the agent
regarding fund usage, and the agent would have inspection rights in the
event any reporting looks suspect. Additionally, the monitoring agent
would monitor the political and economic stability of the country while the
funds are being spent. Changes in stability could suggest a potential
uprising or regime change and would cue the agent to conduct more
aggressive monitoring. Major investment banks would be best suited for
this role, as their preexisting infrastructure would make monitoring more
economically efficient.
Once the sovereign has exhausted the proceeds, the increased monitoring
duties would be eliminated. The monitoring agent would then be allowed
to rely on the compliance certificates permitted under the Trust Indenture
Act.368 The underlying agreement between the bondholders and the
monitoring agent would need to reflect the increased monitoring
requirement while the proceeds are being used.
Both U.S. and English law permit the agent or trustee to accelerate bond
payments if an event of default occurs.369 Under this new structure, the
monitoring agent’s power to accelerate would also extend to breaches of
any covenants regarding the use of bond proceeds. The benefit to
accelerating payments is twofold: the acceleration stops additional funds
from being used odiously and it provides creditors the ability to recoup their
investments. This power should be shared with bondholders so that they
may act if the agent fails to do so. This permits the bondholders to act
unilaterally in order to avoid unnecessary loss.
Under U.K. bond issuances, the trustee is only allowed to renegotiate
U.S. bond issuances only allow technical
nonmaterial terms.370
amendments to be made by the trustee.371 Permitting the monitoring agent
to renegotiate terms of the issuance has some advantages, but may be
limited in its usefulness.372 The additional duty would also result in higher
fees to the monitoring agent. As such, the monitoring agent should only be
permitted to negotiate technical amendments.373 Renegotiation of other
terms would be conducted between the debtor sovereign and the
bondholders. This would alleviate increased costs to the monitoring agent
framework and keep the agent’s role in line with current standards.

367. While many scholars also consider war debts to be odious, they are not included in
this proposed solution. See, e.g., supra note 91 and accompanying text. A covenant against
incurring these debts is not feasible as it would essentially be a promise by the country not to
be overthrown.
368. See supra note 343 and accompanying text.
369. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
370. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
371. See supra note 319.
372. See supra notes 323, 321 and accompanying text.
373. This is consistent with the current role of U.S. trustees. See supra note 319 and
accompanying text.
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3. Keeping the Agent in Line
The bondholders should have a limited right to sue the agent under a trust
indenture in the event the agent fails to act when necessary.374 Only
bondholders representing a material portion of the outstanding debts should
be permitted to sue the monitoring agent for breach of duty.375 Amihud,
Garbade, and Kahan suggest 10 percent may be a sufficient fraction in the
corporate context,376 but this rate would be too low in the sovereign
context. A higher percentage should be used in order to ensure that a single
large bondholder (e.g., a vulture fund) may not act on behalf of the entire
group of bondholders. Allowing a single bondholder to sue on behalf of all
debtholders would ultimately give large bondholders full bargaining power
and risk forcing the monitoring agent to act when the action is not in the
best interest of the overall bondholder group. The underlying agreement
should dictate the level of bondholder support necessary in order to sue the
monitoring agent.
The monitoring agent’s liability should be limited in order to induce
prospective agents to accept the position. However, limitations should not
apply where the agent has acted willfully, recklessly, or in bad faith.377 As
such, bondholder relief should be limited if the agent negligently conducted
its monitoring duties, but should not be limited if the agent accepted a bribe
from a sovereign government to neglect its monitoring duties.
4. Compensating the Agent
The monitoring agent’s duties and its potential liabilities would be higher
than that of a traditional agent while bond proceeds are being used. As
such, its compensation must adequately reflect this. The monitoring agent
would receive increased compensation until the bond proceeds are
exhausted and the increased monitoring duties are over. Once the
monitoring agent is able to rely on compliance certificates from the
sovereign, its compensation would revert to a typical trustee or fiscal agent
fee schedule.
A fee arrangement that is positively tied to the bond’s market value was
proposed for a corporate indenture supertrustee.378 Under this fee schedule,
the trustee benefits from higher fees as the market value increases.379 This
arrangement in a sovereign context is inadvisable. If public perception of a
sovereign’s political status begins to shift, such as a rising fear that a regime
374. Bondholders would not be able to sue under a fiscal agency agreement. This
limitation is ultimately reflected in lower fees given to the fiscal agent. Nonetheless, the
sovereign itself could still sue for a breach under the agreement. This would be helpful
where the monitoring agent failed to monitor the use of proceeds, the despotic regime has
since been overthrown, and the bondholders have accelerated the payments. See infra Part
III.B.5.
375. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
376. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
377. See supra note 331 and accompanying text.
378. See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
379. See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
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has developed despotic tendencies, its credit risk is likely to increase. This
would decrease its market value just as the monitoring needs increase. A
negative correlation between the fees and the current market value would
also inadequately address this issue because it would not incentivize the
monitoring agent to perform its duties more effectively. In order to
adequately compensate the monitoring agent for the level of work and
amount of liability it is taking on, the compensation would be inversely
correlated to the unused bond proceeds. As the bond proceeds are used, the
monitoring agent’s compensation would decrease.
The higher the level of monitoring that is required, the higher the agent’s
fees during the monitoring period will need to be. Monitoring agents would
otherwise lack adequate incentive to take on a risky sovereign’s bond
issuance. Larger fees for more at-risk sovereigns result in bondholders
demanding higher interest rates. Interest rates reflect the level of risk
associated with an investment. Bondholders would require higher interest
rates from politically or economically unstable countries. As such, the
monitoring agent’s increased fee structure could be baked into the higher
interest rates.
The agent’s compensation throughout the life of the bond would be
determined at appointment. Stable cash flows would encourage more
financial institutions to seek out monitoring agent positions. The
compensation would only be amended by the bondholders under a trust
arrangement or the issuer under a fiscal agency agreement. However, the
monitoring agent should reserve the right to petition the bondholders or
issuer for an increased fee any time it is not being adequately compensated
for its duties.
5. Fiscal Agency Agreement Considerations
There would be no bondholder reelection opportunity under a fiscal
agency arrangement, because the monitoring agent would represent the
sovereign debtor.380 The agent would be appointed by the issuer and would
only be subject to removal under the terms of the agreement.
It is in the best interests of both the bondholders and the sovereign’s
constituents to have proceeds used for non-odious purposes. Yet, the
monitoring agent is more at risk for being induced to breach its monitoring
duties under a fiscal agency agreement due to its direct relationship with the
sovereign. As such, it is important that the sovereign’s constituents (in
particular, the government that has replaced a despotic regime) be permitted
to sue the monitoring agent for breach of duties.
The monitoring agent’s fees under a fiscal agency arrangement should be
lower than under an indenture trustee arrangement, because of a lower level
of immediate accountability under the fiscal agency arrangement.
Bondholders are incentivized to sue any time the agent has breached its
monitoring duties under the trust indenture. The sovereign, however, is

380. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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only incentivized to sue for failure to monitor if it has replaced a previous
regime that used the debts for odious purposes.
6. Utilizing the Monitoring Agent Appropriately
This Note proposes that the monitoring agent specifically be used to
monitor for odious uses of debt. The monitoring agent should only be
appointed for bond issuances that are seen as more “at risk.” While the
agent’s fees will be lower where the sovereign is less risky, the fee will still
be larger than that of a traditional fiscal agent or trustee.
The World Bank’s data portal, which covers corruption and budget
transparency, could be used to determine which at-risk countries should
utilize a monitoring agent in their debt offerings.381 The monitoring agent
could be required when the sovereign’s corruption and lack of transparency
ratings are either greater than or significantly greater than (e.g., 20 percent
greater than) the mean ratings.
C. Anticipated Criticisms to the Approach
This Note does not purport to solve all problems with respect to odious
debt. There are risks and shortcomings to this approach; some are without
merit and others will need to be left unresolved. This section first discusses
the possibility that the monitoring agent will overuse its new powers. Next,
it discusses the implications of allowing the monitoring agent to label a
sovereign as odious. Finally, it elaborates on what issues have not been
addressed by the monitoring agent solution.
1. The Overreaction Possibility
Opponents of the monitoring agent solution may argue that the creation
of an agent empowered to identify odious uses of borrowed funds will
overreact. The fear is that the monitoring agent will seek to accelerate bond
payments at the mere sight of questionable uses of funds. This is unlikely
due to the nature in which the monitoring agent is appointed. It is in a
sovereign’s best interest not to appoint a monitoring agent with a reputation
for overreacting.
2. The Problem with Pointing the Finger
The doctrine of odious debt has political implications. By accelerating
repayments, a monitoring agent claims that a government has used its debt
proceeds to either subjugate its own people or for fraudulent, illegal, or
corrupt purposes.382 Should monitoring agents be allowed to make such
allegations?
A sovereign is unlikely to concede that it has been using debt proceeds
odiously without the ruling of an actual court. Sovereigns would be
381. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
382. See generally supra Part I.B.2.
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incentivized to renegotiate terms with the bondholders in order to avoid the
risk of an adverse outcome in court. If negotiations fail, the question
becomes which institution should be allowed to make findings at issue.
As discussed above, a new international body or arbitration panel is
unlikely to gain support in the international community.383 A traditional
court system is a more likely avenue for resolving this use of proceeds
issue. A court determination on the issue of whether a sovereign has been
using funds odiously has political implications, but they may be
exaggerated. For example, countries have been willing to waive their
sovereign immunity for the last several decades.384 Investors can already
sue sovereign debtors for failing to meet their obligations under a bond
issuance, and courts can already order specific performance from them.385
As such, the use of the doctrine in order to invoke debt forgiveness is
arguably just an ancillary part to the theory of sovereign immunity.
3. The Limitations to the Doctrine
The monitoring agent solution is intended to stop odious expenditures
before complete damage is done. It is intended to help creditors recover
part of their investment rather than being left empty-handed. The
monitoring agent will not resolve all problems inherent to the odious debt
doctrine. Monitoring agents will be incentivized to perform their duties
adequately, but they will not be able to perform their roles flawlessly. It is
possible that an agent’s continuous monitoring will miss some odious uses
of debt.
The solution does not address the forgiveness of odious debt under a trust
indenture once a despotic regime has been overthrown. Sovereigns will
need to defer to traditional debt restructurings with the bondholders when in
this position. It does, however, permit a sovereign to sue a monitoring
agent appointed under a fiscal agency agreement if it has breached its duties
while a despotic regime was in place.
CONCLUSION
This Note provided a broad overview of sovereign debt and an in-depth
look at the doctrine of odious debt. It outlined the proposed solutions for
the odious debt doctrine that have developed over time, dividing the
solutions between ex post and ex ante mechanisms. Lastly, it proposed an
expanded role for the standard indenture trustee and fiscal agent in bond
issuances.
In its expanded role, the agent would engage in continuous monitoring of
the use of proceeds and have the power to accelerate bond payments. This
Note recognizes that it is impossible to stop odious lending before it starts,
but it provides a realistic way to enforce the odious debt doctrine by
utilizing current actors and institutions. The solution benefits creditors by
383. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
384. See supra Part I.B.4.c.
385. See, e.g., supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
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allowing them to demand payment when proceeds are used odiously.
Moreover, the solution helps debtor nations by cutting short odious
expenditures before the damage caused by despotic regimes is complete.

